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PREFACE
Despite their common ancestry, an intellectual schism has
developed between international law and political science.2 This
division stems, in part, from what Oran Young calls "the two-
cultures problem."3 Students of international law and political
science represent different intellectual communities.. They use
different modes of reasoning and different forms of discourse in
seeking answers to the questions they pose. In essence, the two
cultures represent distinct language communities, burdened with
all the difficulties of translation and interpretation.'
Recently, attempts have been made to forge a link between
theories of international relations' and international law.'
2 According to Nicholas Onuf and James Taulbee, "[a]s an area of serious
study, international law has all but disappeared from the contemporary
curricula of political science and international relations ... in the United
States." Nicholas G. Onuf & James Larry Taulbee, Bringing Law to Bear on
International Relations Theory Courses, 26 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 249, 249 (1993).
For extensive studies on the trends of teaching international law, see, e.g.,
RICHARD EDWARDS, A SURVEY OF THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN POLiTICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENTS (1963) (reporting the results of a survey
conducted under the auspices of the American Society of International Law and
the American Political Science Association, investigating the methods of
teaching international law); JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE 1990s (1992) (reporting the results of a survey conducted by the
American Society of International Law, focusing on how international law is
taught to students of law and students of political science); James Larry
Taulbee, Images of International Law: What Do Students Learn from Internation-
al Relations Textbooks?, 15 TEACHING POL. SCI. 74 (1988) (stating that few
university departments offer international law).
' Oran Young, Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 172, 174 (1992)
[hereinafter Remarks]; see also MICHAEL NICHOLSON, FORMAL THEORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10-13 (1990) (stating that scholars with different
backgrounds study issues differently which may cause tension); C.P. SNOW,
THE Two CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK 2-4 (1964) (asserting that the
intellectual life of Western society is increasingly being split into two cultures
- literary intellectuals and scientists).
4 See Remarks, supra note 3, at 175.
s Most scholars use the term "international relations theory." See Kenneth
W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus or International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbott, Modern Interna-
tional Relations Theory]; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
However, this term is misplaced if not inaccurate. It suggests that there is only
one theory of international relations. In fact, there are many different theories
that seek to explain international behavior. These theories emphasize either
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Scholars have begun to identify a common ground between the
two disciplines. For example, both disciplines examine the
concept of order in international affairs. Similarly, both are
interested in designing mechanisms that facilitate cooperation in
an anarchic world. Building upon this common ground, these
disciplines have much to contribute to one another!7 Indeed, this
individual, state, or systemic factors to explain international behavior. See
generally JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTEND-
ING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (3d ed. 1990) (presenting
contending theories of international relations by drawing insights from
traditional and behavioral-scientific fields); KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE
STATE AND WAR (1959) (investigating the contributions of classical political
theory to understanding different causes of interstate conflict and defining the
conditions under which war can be controlled); Jack S. Levy, The Causes of
War: A Review of Theories and Evidence, in 1 BEHAVIOR, SOCIETY, AND NU-
CLEAR WAR (Philip E. Tetlock et al. eds., 1989) (providing an exhaustive review
of international relations theories).
6 See, e.g., Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory, supra note 5
(suggesting the relevance of modern international relations theory and the work
of its leading contributors to the study of international law); Slaughter Burley,
supra note 5 (proposing an interdisciplinary bridge involving the application of
"liberal" international relations theory to law within and among nations);
Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agree-
ments, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549 (1991) (examining arms control agreements to
illustrate aspects of formalized evolving international commitments).
In addition to these seminal works, this interdisciplinary approach has been
used by several authors. See, e.g., William B.T. Mock, Game Theory, Signalling,
and International Legal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 33
(1992) (applying game theory to examine the role of signalling in international
legal relations); Miguel MontafiA-Mora, lnternational Law and International
Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relations
Perspective on the U.S./EC Aicultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 19 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (199.3) (asserting that the EC/U.S. agricultural subsidy
dispute is best understood by adding insights fr6m international relations
theory to existing legal analysis); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996) (appying institutionalist theory to examine the
concept of iteration in the law o treaties); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44
DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (analyzing three competing normative approaches to
World Trade Organization trade legalism by drawing on international relations,
economics, and legal theory).
7 Scholars of both law and political science have suggested the benefits of
interdisciplinary research. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint
Discipline, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 167, 168 (1992); Christopher C.
Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist Wandering in the
World of International Law, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 385, 390 (1987);
Robert 0. Keohane, Compliance with International Commitments: Politics
Within a Framework of Law, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 176, 180 (1992);
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merger creates a powerful interdisciplinary approach to the study
of international cooperation
This article seeks to introduce elements from a third discipline
to the study of international cooperation - economics? The
fruitful merger of law and economics and the recent insights
Justin Rosenberg, The International Imagination: IR Theory and 'Classic Social
Analysis,' 23 MILLENNIUM 85, 86 (1994); Slaughter Burley, supra note 5, at 206.
' This Article presupposes a common background and common goals for
law, international relations, and economics. Thus, as noted by John Setear, "I
have not chosen this intersection of theories like some Mendelian gardener
waiting detachedly to see which intellectual oddities will result from the
interbreeding of academic schools of thought." Correspondence from John
Setear, Professor, UCLA School of Law (Apr. 15, 1995).
9 The application of economic theory to the study of law is well-known.
See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1990) (examining the
relationship between law and economics); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986) (applying economic theory to a wide range of
legal issues); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 23 (1989) (arguing that the law and economics movement has been losing
its trajectory within law schools); Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain ofEconomics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
53 (1985) .(asserting that economics 
penetrates
al social disciplines and is reciprocally 
affected by them); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Intellectua7 Foundations of 
Law and Economics, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
184
(1983) (identifying and defending 
the basic contributions law and 
economics
have made to the study of law); Richard 
A. Pser, The Economic A pp roach 
to
Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975) 
(analyzing the economic approach 
to law);
Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, 
The New Legal Process, the Synthesis 
of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 
(1996)
(arguing that law and economics scholarship 
and outside scholarship (including
critical race theory and radical feminist 
theory) share a common ground, 
which
includes the analysis of institutions).
Moreover, the application of economic 
theory to international legal issues
is increasing. See, e.g., Howard 
F. Chang, An Economic Analysis 
f Trade
Measures to Protect the lobal Environment, 
83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) (addressing
the role of international trade restrictions 
in supporting policies to protect
global environment); Symposium, 
Economic AnaEsis of International 
Law, 16
INTL REV. L. & ECON. 1 1996) 
examining a broad variety of economic 
issues
in trade and business 
transactions).
In addition, the benefits of interdisciplinary 
work have been recognized in
a number of distinct fields. See, e.g., 
Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary 
Legal
Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 
42 DUKE L.J. 840 (1993) (describin 
the
anomalies of interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship); Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplnary
Perspectives on the Improvement 
of International Environmental 
Law and
Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 723 
(1994) (book review) (reviewing 
three
recent publications 
on international 
aspects of environmental 
protection);
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: 
Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric 
of
Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 597 (considering how lawyers 
and
nonlawyers discuss the contribution 
of interdisciplinary scholarship to 
the law
as a means of rethinking the relationship 
between these two disciplines").
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gained from international law and theories of international
relations suggest that the triad of law, international relations, and
economics is a natural extension for an interdisciplinary research
agenda that examines international cooperation. 0
1. INTRODUCTION
For both international legal scholars and political scientists, the
problems associated with achieving international cooperation are
well-known." "Whether expressed through the 2 x 2 matrix of
the Prisoners' Dilemma or the logic of collective action, the
central issue is the same - rational, egoistic actors will seek to
maximize individual utility, even at the cost of the common
good."12 Two fundamental assumptions underlie most studies of
10 This article assumes certain benefits can be gained from the rationality
assumptions of economics. But see Alexander Rosenberg, Can Economic Theory
Explain Everything?, 9 PHIL. & SOC. SCI. 509 (1979) (criticizing claims that
economic theory can explain everything in its domain).
" Cooperation in the context of international affairs is defined as a
situation where "actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination." ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 51 (1984) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY].
12 William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 430 (1995) [hereinafter Aceves,
Lost Sovereignty?]; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-7 (1990) (describing
three models for analyzing collective behavior); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective
Action in the Utilization oJ Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International
Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 388-89 (1996) (discussing the
collective action problem in the context of shared freshwater resources); David
Goetze, Comparing Prisoner's Dilemma, Commons Dilemma, and Public Goods
Provision Designs in Laboratory Experiments, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 56, 56-58
(1994) (exploring the collective action phenomenon through controlled
laboratory experiments).
The Prisoners' Dilemma is a game theory model that describes how
competing interests between two egoistic actors may lead to sub-optimal
behavior which inhibits cooperation. See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of
International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25, 25 (1985) (discussing the recent trend
of applyin game theory to international politics analysis). But cf R. Harrison
Wagner, The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation, 77
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 330, 344-45 (1983) (arguing the inadequacy of the Prisoners'
Dilemma model as a tool for analyzing international conflicts).
The collective action problem suggests that rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve a common group goal unless some form of
coercion is present. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1986) (investigating important problems of sociology and
of society using a paradigm of national action borrowed from economics);
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international cooperation. First, states are the principal actors in
international affairs.13  Second, the international system is
characterized as a decentralized system that lacks a hierarchical
enforcement mechanism.1 4 These two factors render cooperation
difficult.
Studies of international cooperation examine the problem of
developing cooperative behavior among egoistic actors and
maintaining such collaboration under conditions of anarchy."5
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (studying the problem of
collective action in social contexts); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965) (explaining that irrational, self-interested
individuals will not achieve their common interests unless there is coercion);
TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1992) (analyzing the factors that
influence whether collective action will follow voluntarily or whether it needs
to be fostered by government).
"3 See Kenneth A., Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses
and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1 (Kenneth A. Oye ed.,
1986). Despite its primacy in studies of international cooperation, the state-
centric paradigm is not absolute. Several scholars have emphasized the
importance of non-actors in international affairs. See, e.g., GRAHAM T.
ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLANING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 4-5
(1971) (proposing alternative conceptual models to explain and predict the
behavior of national governments; Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image
Reversed: The International Sources o Domestic Politics, 32 INT'L ORG. 881, 911
(1978) (arguing that domestic politics and international relations ought to be
analyzed simultaneously); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:
The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 460 (1988) (contrasting state-
centric theories with the two-level approach).
4 While most studies of cooperation agree on the existence of an anarchical
international system, there is some disagreement as to its consequences. See,
e.g., David A. Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics, in
NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 3 (David
A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (examining the diverging points of view on the nature
and consequences of anarchy); Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in
International Relations Theory: A Critique, 17 REV. INT'L STUD. 67 (1991)
(suggesting that "a more fruitful way to understand the international system
comibines anarchy and interdependence"); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391,
410-12 (1992) (arguing that international institutions are capable of shaping state
interests).
.s A review of the major works on international cooperation attests to the
primacy of this fundamental area of study. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3 (1984) [hereinafter AXELROD, EVOLUTION]
(asking "[u]nder what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists
without central authority?"); KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 11, at
9 (examining "[u]nder what conditions can independent countries cooperate in
the world political economy? In particular, can cooperation take place without
hegemony and, if so, how?"); Oye, supra note 13, at 1 (asking "[i]f international
relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean civil
[Vol. 17:41000
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These studies suggest that international institutions can increase
the likelihood that cooperative behavior will develop among
states.16 Institutions are defined as "persistent and connected sets
of [formal and informal] rules that prescribe behavioral roles,
constrain activity, and shape expectations.""7  They are not
simple, ad hoc arrangements concerning discrete transactions,
rather, institutions involve long-term relationships between
interested actors. Institutionalist theory suggests that "[i]nstitu-
tions matter because they provide a stable environment for
mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide and constrain
society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?").
16 See generally Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION
UNDER ANARCHY, supra note 13, at 226, 228 (arguing that a contextual
approach to strategy leads to seeing the importance of international institutions,
helping to forge necessary links between game-theoretic arguments and theories
about international regimes); Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise
of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39 (1995) (affirming the value and
relevance of the institutionalist research program in the face of criticisms from
other theoretical approaches); Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in
Economic and Security Affairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1, 22 (1984) (asserting that the
juxtaposition of states as independent actors and of their choices resulting in
interdependent consequences defines the problems of international relations);
Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic
World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299, 299 (1982) (developing "a conceptualization of
regimes as serving to circumscribe national behavior and thus to shape
international interactions"). But see Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits
of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42
INT'L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) (arguing that "new liberal institutionalism fails to
address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is
generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism"); John
J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC. 5,
7 (1994) (concluding that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior,
and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War
world").
"7 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32
INT'L STUD. Q. 379, 386 (1988).
Institutions are the intellectual successors of international regimes. Regimes
have been defined as "princip!es, norms, rules, and decision-maing procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). See
also ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 12-19 (1989)
(providing a detailed definitional analysis of a regime); Stephan Haggard & Beth
A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 493-96
(1987) (defining regimes by observing patterned behavior).
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behavior."
A significant limitation to the development and operation of
international institutions, however, involves the problem of
transaction costs, an issue that has been identified in the literature
on the new institutional economics.19 It is generally recognized
that all contractual arrangements are plagued by transaction costs.
Briefly stated, transaction costs are the costs of arranging,
monitoring, and enforcing a contract.20  Transaction costs affect
the ability of the parties to make exhaustive agreements capable
of addressing all possible contingencies that may arise in the
course of their relationship. Thus, any contract that calls for
future performance will be incomplete. 21 As a result, the parties
may face costly adjustments to address unforeseen contingencies.
Alternatively, one party may seek to extract quasi-rents from the
other party through opportunistic behavior during the course of
" Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 INT'L
REV. L. & EcON. 121, 127 (1996) [hereinafter Snidal, Political Economy].
'9 New institutional economics is also referred to as the new economics of
organization or as transaction cost economics. See generally MALCOLM
RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS (1994) (analyzing the old
institutional economics, the American institutionalist tradition, the new
institutional economics, and the classical economics tradition); James G. March
and Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 (1984) (evaluating the effect of institutions on
politics and offering a theoretical framework for further study of institutions);
Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Or anization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739
(1984) (exploring how the new institutiona economics can further the study of
public bureaucracy); Symposium, The New Institutional Economics: Recent
Progress; Expanding Frontiers, 149 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 1 (1993)
(examining the broad application of institutional economics as well as recent
developments in the literature).
20 One definition of transaction costs is "the costs of all resources required
to transfer property rights from one economic agent to another. They include
the costs of making an exchange (e.g., discovering exchange opportunities,
negotiating exchange, monitoring, and enforcement), and the costs of
maintaining and protecting the institutional structure (e.g., judiciary, police,
armed forces)." SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS
AND SYSTEMS 84 (1995).
21 For a discussion of the problems associated with incomplete contracts,
see Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL
ECONOMY 57, 60 Gfames E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990). For an addi-
tional analysis see Ronald A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT'L
ECON. REV. 233 (1985).
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the contractual relationship.'
This Article suggests that transaction costs affect all contractual
arrangements, including the development and operation of
international institutions.? Like firms engaged in private
contractual relations, states are involved in the negotiation and
implementation of contractual arrangements. These arrangements
are also subject to transaction costs. As a result, international
agreements will be incomplete because states cannot address all
possible contingencies that may arise during their contractual
relationship. Thus, transaction costs affect the development and
operation of international institutions.
Transaction cost economics suggests that governance structures
emerge to address the problems raised by transaction costs.2 4
These governance structures vary from the discrete market
' The quasi-rent value of an asset "is the excess of its value over its salvage
value, that is, its value in its next best use to another renter. The potentially
appropriable specialized portion of the quasi rent is that portion, if any, in
excess of its value to the second highest-valuing user." Benjamin Klein et al.,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & EcON. 297, 298 (1978) [hereinafter Klein et al., Appropriable Rents].
23 For examples of the application of transaction cost economics to
international issues, see generally KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note
11, passim; David C. Kang, South Korean and Taiwanese Development and the
New Institutional Economics, 49 INT'L ORG. 555 (1995) (book review) (analyzing
the economic impact of the international system on the countries of East Asia);
David A. Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,
50 INT'L ORG. 1 (1996) (using economic concepts to compare NATO and the
Warsaw Pact); Hendrik Spruyt, Institutional Selection in International Relations:
State Anarchy as Order, 48 INT'L ORG. 527 (1994) (analyzing how economic
needs influenced the creation and success of sovereign territorial states); Mark
Tilton, Informal Market Governance in Japan's Basic Materials Industries, 48
INT'L ORG. 663 (1994) (arguing that the contracting practices of Japanese
industries impede foreign imports more than formal state policies); Beth V.
Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, International Contracting and Territorial
Controk The Boundary Question, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 239
(1994) [hereinafter Yarbrough & Yarbrough, International Contracting] (noting
that transaction costs can make international contracts insufficiently credible);
Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, International Institutions and the
New Economics of Organization, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 (1990) [hereinafter
Yarbrough & Yarbrough, Institutions] (applying the principles of the new
economics of organization to the international political economy).
24 See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in
Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
335, 336-37 (1995).
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transaction to the fully integrated firm.' This Article examines
two forms of governance structure: exogenous and endogenous
structures.6 Exogenous governance structures authorize a third
party to address any disputes or unforeseen issues that may
develop during the course of the contractual arrangement. These
structures can take several forms ranging from arbitration to
judicial settlement. In contrast, endogenous governance structures
address disputes within the context of the contractual relationship.
Through this type of structure, the parties resolve their own
problems as they arise. By developing a relationship that
recognizes the importance of dynamic responses to change, the
parties can establish a mutually reinforcing relationship that can
resolve disputes as well as new issues.
Exogenous or endogenous governance structures also address
transaction costs at the international level. While students of
international cooperation rarely look to international law for
guidance, a fundamental principle of international law provides
the foundation for endogenous governance structures - the
concept of state practice. State practice minimizes the problems
of transaction costs at the international level and is an important
element in the two principal sources of international law: treaty
25 See id. at 337. Shelanshi and Klein state:
Governance structures can be described along a spectrum. At one end
lies the pure, anonymous spot market, which suffices for simple
transactions such as basic commodity sales .... At the other end of
the spectrum ... lies the fully integrated firm, where trading parties
are under unified ownership and control. ... The movement from
market to hierarchy thus entails a trade-off between the high-powered
incentives and adaptive properties of the market, and the safeguards
and central coordinating properties of the firm.
Id.
26 The terms exogenous and endogenous are generally not used to refer to
governance structures in transaction cost economics. However, they are
preferable to the more common terms of trilateral and bilateral governance
structures because they refer to the source of governance rather than to the
number of actors involved. For a related discussion, see Snidal, Political
Economy, supra note 18, at 127-29; Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope:
Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, 6 J. THEORETICAL POL. 449,
454-58 (1994) [hereinafter Snidal, Politics of Scope]. The terms exogenous and
endogenous governance structures are also similar to the formal and informal
instruments of active management identified by Chayes and Chayes in their
analysis of treaty compliance. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 201-27 (1995).
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law and customary international law.' Specifically, state practice
allows states to interpret or even modify their original agreements
through subsequent practice, thereby diminishing the need to draft
extensive agreements at the outset. Additionally, states maintain
the flexibility necessary to address new circumstances as they arise
while remaining grounded within the context of their original
agreement. Alternatively, continuous and long-standing state
practice may develop into customary international law that is
legally binding on those states that acquiesce in its formation and
development. Customary international law allows states to
promote cooperation in the absence of formal agreements. It
minimizes the problems raised by transaction costs by allowing
states to forgo explicit negotiations and to function even in the
absence of a formal structure. It is also flexible enough to address
new circumstances as they arise. In both treaty law and custom-
ary international law, therefore, state practice facilitates the
development of governance structures that address the problems
raised by transaction costs.
This Article is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides
a brief introduction to the study of transaction cost economics.
After describing both the causes and consequences of transaction
costs, it examines several governance structures designed to reduce
the problems raised by these costs. Section 3 applies transaction
cost economics to the study of international cooperation. While
this approach has traditionally been applied to private business
transactions, it applies with equal rigor to international affairs.
Specifically, this section examines how international law can
facilitate the development of both exogenous and endogenous
governance structures. Section 4 then reviews the concept of state
practice in customary international law and treaty law. Finally,
Section 5 examines how state practice provides the basis for
developing endogenous governance structures. These structures
address some of the problems raised by transaction costs.
The goals of this Article are twofold. It seeks to demonstrate
the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach that merges the
conceptual and theoretical framework of law with international
relations and economics to examine the problem of international
cooperation. More broadly, this Article hopes to reaffirm the
27 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56-62 (Sir Humphrey Waldock
ed., 6th ed. 1963).
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relevance of international law.
2. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE LIMITATIONS
OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
Ronald Coase pioneered the concept of transaction costs.
28
Coase's groundbreaking work challenges the neoclassical assump-
tions of complete information and costless exchanges in contractu-
al arrangements. 29  Rather, Coase suggests that costs inure to
transactions:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary
to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms,
to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw
up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to
make sure that the terms of the contract are being ob-
served, and so on.30
These costs have a significant impact on contractual arrangements.
Coase indicates that if transaction costs are taken into account,
many contractual arrangements would not be made.31
To minimize the consequences of transaction costs, Coase
suggests that institutions will develop in order to overcome the
inherent limitations of market transactions. Specifically, firms
will supersede market transactions.32 Firms greatly reduce the
28 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
29 In addition to these basic assumptions of neoclassical economics, "[t]he
paradigmatic contract of neoclassical economics ... is a discrete transaction in
which no duties exist between the parties prior to the contract formation and
in which the duties of the parties are determined at the formation stage."
Victor P. Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J.
ECON. ISSUES 45, 49 (1976). For a comparison of neoclassical economics and
transaction cost economics, see THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
AND INSTITUTIONS 3-32 (1990). For an example of the "old" institutional
economics, see JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE
LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1912).
30 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
31 See R.H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 175 (1988).
32 The firm is an integral component of microeconomic theory. See
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS 195-216 1988);
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cost of using price mechanisms, including the costs of negotiating
and concluding contracts for the exchanges that take place."
The firm, therefore, is seen as an efficient response to the
problems raised by transaction costs.
Oliver Williamson subsequently refined the concept of
transaction costs. 34  Like Coase, Williamson recognizes the
existence of ex ante costs.3 These include the costs of drafting
and negotiating agreements.36 In addition to these ex ante costs,
contractual arrangements also involve ex post costs. Ex post costs
include:
(1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift
out of alignment ... (2) the haggling costs incurred if
bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments,
(3) the setup and running costs associated with the gover-
nance structures (often not the courts) to which disputes
are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure
commitments .3
According to Williamson, transaction costs are the costs of
negotiating a contract ex ante and monitoring it ex post as opposed
to the production costs, which are the costs of enacting the
contract.
38
Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds.,
1989).
" See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 28, at 390.
14 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 15-32 (1985); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES (1975) (providing a microeconomic analysis of economic organiza-
tions, both within andbetween markets and hierarchies); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 233 (1979) (describing the importance of transaction costs and analyzing
the governance structures of transactions).
1s See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 20 (distinguishing between ex ante and ex post costs).
36 See id.
37 Id. at 21.
31 See R.C.O. Matthews, The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of
Growth, 96 ECON. J. 903, 906 (1986); see also Carl Dahlman, The Problem of
Externality, 22 J. LEGAL STUDIES 141, 148 (1979) (suggesting that transaction
costs include: (1) search and information costs; (2) bargaining and decision costs;
and (3) policing and enforcement costs). Dahlman indicates, however, that "this
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2.1. The Causes of Transaction Costs
Williamson offers two explanations for the phenomenon of
transaction costs: factors pertaining to the individuals who
undertake the transaction, and factors specific to the particular
transaction."
The human factors that contribute to the development of
transaction costs are bounded rationality and opportunism.
4
0
While individuals may seek to act as rational actors, they are
restrained by their limited capacity to understand and process all
the information they receive. 4' According to Williamson,
"[t]ransaction cost economics assumes that human agents are
subject to bounded rationality, whence behavior is 'intendedly
rational, but only limitedly so."" Indeed, bounded rationality
is "the cognitive assumption on which transaction cost economics
functional taxonomy of different transaction costs is unnecessarily elaborate:
functionally, the three classes reduce to a single one - for they all have in
common that they represent resource losses due to lack of information." Id.
19 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 44-52. For an excellent summary of Williamson's theory of
transaction costs, see DAVID M. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 743-70 (1990) [hereinafter KREPS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY]. See
also ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 18 (1983) (discussing Williamson's
ideas on transaction cost determinants).
40 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 44-52. Williamson identified the existence of a third element of
human nature - dignity. He indicated, however, that this element needed
further development before it could be incorporated into the theory of transac-
tion cost economics. See id. at 44 n.3; see also Tony McGuiness, Markets and
Managerial Hierarchies, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM 42, 44 (R. Clarke &
Tony McGuiness eds., 1987) (describing bounded rationality and opportunism).
41 The notion that parties cannot address all possible contingencies is based
upon Herbert Simon's work on bounded rationality. See HERBERT T. SIMON,
Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in MODELS OF MAN 196, 198-
206 (1957) (noting that the human mind does not have the capacity to solve
complex problems in the manner required for objectively rational behavior); see
also PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 12640 (1992) (describing bounded rationality); David M. Kreps
& Robert Wilson, Reputation and Impeect Information, 27J. ECON. THEORY
253 (1982) (examining the influence of imperfect (or incomplete) information
on the development of reputation).
42 WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 30 (citations omitted).
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relies."43 Specifically, bounded rationality makes comprehensive
contracting infeasible.
Alternatively, parties to a transaction may resort to opportu-
nistic behavior in order to realize individual gains.44 Such action
may take several forms, ranging from the withholding of relevant
information to the intentional transmission of incorrect informa-
tion.4' For example, "[o]ne party might strategically withhold
information that would increase the total gains from contracting
(the 'size of the pie') in order to increase her private share of the
gains from contracting (her 'share of the pie')."46
In addition to human factors, transaction costs arise as a result
of factors unique to particular transactions. Specifically, transac-
tions differ with respect to asset specificity, uncertainty, and
frequency.47  Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the
value of an asset depends upon the continuation of a specific
relationship.4 Asset specificity creates the possibility of appro-
priable quasi-rents which, in turn, raises the possibility of
opportunistic behavior. Uncertainty refers to the inability to
predict the outcome of future events.49 It is caused by both
41 Id. at 45.
'4 See id. at 47; see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining With Uncertainty,
Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations,
44 HASTINGS LJ. 621, 64243 (1993) (arguing that opportunism "often explains
why [contracting parties] dispense with formal, bargained-for contracts")-
45 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-
BEARING (1974) (describing problems of risk-bearing and risk aversion ; George
A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970) (discussing the effects of dishonest
information).
46 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 94 (1989); see also Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law
of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 225-26 (1990) (contrasting costs
of implementation with costs of strategic behavior).
47 See WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 52.
48 See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 Am. ECON. REv. 519, 526 (1983) (stating t at there are
several forms of asset specificity: site specificity; physical asset specificity;
human asset specificity; and dedicated asset specificity).
49 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2
(1983) (defining legal uncertainty as "the situation that obtains when the rule
that is relevant to a given act or transaction is said by informed attorneys to
have an expected official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability");
Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 75, 77-84
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environmental conditions and behavioral conduct. Uncertainty of
future events and the resulting need for adaptive governance
structures constitute inevitable components of all contractual
arrangements. As noted by Friedrich Hayek, "the economic
problem of society is mainly one of adaptation to changes in
particular circumstances of time and place."50 Frequency refers
to the extent to which a particular transaction is repeated. As the
frequency of a particular transaction increases, transaction costs
will increase concomitantly. The impact of each of these factors
on the development of transaction costs varies due to their
interaction effects. 1
Thus, transaction costs economics identifies a significant
limitation to the development and operation of contractual
arrangements. Because of transaction costs, complex contracts are
invariably incomplete and many are maladaptive. As a result, two
consequences emerge. First, the contracting parties may face
costly adjustments in addressing unforeseen contingencies.52
Second, one party may seek to extract quasi-rents from the other
party through opportunistic behavior.53 Indeed, if transaction
costs are sufficiently high, parties may decide to forgo the
agreement altogether.
2.2. Remediesfor Transaction Costs
Williamson suggests that identifying mechanisms that can
effectively respond to unforeseen contingencies may solve the
problem of incomplete contracts. "Instrumental gap filling thus
is an important part of contract execution. Whether it is done
easily and effectively or, instead, reaching successive agreements on
(1984) (analyzing the effects of uncertainty in contract law).
50 Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1945).
11 See WILIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 60.
52 See id. at 178 (stating that "[m]any contingencies are unforeseen (and even
unforeseeable), and the adaptations to those contingencies that have been
recognized for which adjustments have been agreed to are often mistaken").
13 See Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The
Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 37
(1985) ("When contingencies arise that are not fully and unambiguously covered
by formal contractual provisions, one or both parties to the transaction may
have incentives to 'behave badly' by taking actions that increase the costs or
reduce the revenues that will be obtained by the other party.").
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adaptations and their implementation is costly makes a huge
difference in evaluating the efficacy of contracts." -4 The organi-
zational imperative that emerges is: "Organize transactions so as
to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously
safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism."
55
More broadly, Williamson posits that efficiency guides the
development of economic institutions: "Transaction cost
economics maintains that there are rational economic reasons for
organizing some transactions one way and other transactions
another. 5 6 As transaction costs increase, transactions according-
ly become more complex and integrated. This transition explains
the variation in transactional forms, which range from discrete
and simple contracts to more complex contractual arrangements.
Transaction cost economics maintains that this is a result of
underlying differences in the characteristics of transactionsY
Williamson identifies four types of governance structures that
regulate contractual arrangements: market, exogenous, endoge-
nous, and unified. Market governance structures regulate the
most simple and discrete forms of contractual arrangements. 9
51 WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 178.
51 Id. at 32.
11 Id. at 52; see also MICHAEL DIETRICH, TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
AND BEYOND: TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM 15-30 (1994);
Oliver Hart, An Economist' Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1762-63 (1989); Christos Pitelis, Transaction Costs, Markets and
Hierarchies: The Issues, in TRANSACTION COSTS, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES
7, 9-11 (Christos Pitelis ed., 1993). But see Gregory K. Dow, The Function of
Authority in Transaction Cost Economics, 8 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 13 (1987).
57 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 68. In contrast, Alchian and Demsetz explain the existence of the
firm by focusing on the costs of monitoring productivity. See Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781-85 (1972).
58 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 72-78; see also KREPS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 39, at
750-51 (discussing Williamson's classifications of governance structures).
Williamson actually uses the terms "trilateral" and "bilateral" to describe
exogenous and endogenous governance structures. As discussed supra, however,
"exogenous" and "endogenous" are preferable because they refer to the source
of governance rather than the number of actors involved. See supra note 26.
" "A truly discrete exchange transaction would be entirely separate not
only from all other present relations but from all past and future relations as
well." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long.Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
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In market governance structures,
the specific identity of the parties is of negligible impor-
tance; substantive content is determined by reference to
formal terms of the contract; and legal rules apply. Market
alternatives are mainly what protect each party against
opportunism by his opposite. Litigation is strictly for
settling claims; concentrated efforts to sustain the relation
are not made, because the relation is not independently
valued.6"
Market governance structures emphasize the discrete nature of the
transaction and enhance presentiation.61
As a contract becomes more complex and the arrangement
extends beyond a discrete relationship, new problems arise which
the market governance structure cannot handle.62 These con-
tracts typically involve long-term arrangements or significant
uncertainty. As a result, more complex governance structures
854, 856 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustment].
60 WILLUAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALSM, supra
note 34, at 74. Similarly, Macneil notes that "[g]enerally speaking, a serious
conflict, even quite a minor one such as an objection to a harmlessly late tender
of the delivery of goods, terminates the discrete contract as a live one and
leaves nothing but a conflict over money damages to be settled by a lawsuit."
Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 877.
61 According to Macneil,
[p]resentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person
perceives the effect of the future on the p resent. It is a recognition
that the course of the future is so unalterably bound by present
conditions that the future has been brought effectively into the present
so that it may be dealt with just as if it were in fact the present. Thus,
the presentiation of a transaction involves restricting its expected
future effects to those defined in the present, ie., at the inception of
the transaction.
Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 863.
62 Macneil identifies several elements where discrete transactions differ from
complex contractual relations. These include: "(1) commencement, duration
and termination; (2) measurement and specificity; (3) planning; (4) sharing vs.
dividing benefits and burdens; (5) interdependence, future cooperation, and
solidarity; (6) personal relations among, and numbers of, participants; and (7)
power." Ian R. Macneil, EconomicAnalysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls
and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018,
1025 (1981).
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emerge in response to increasing transaction costs. Long-term
contracts have two common characteristics: (1) the existence of
gaps in their planning, and (2) the presence of a range of tech-
niques to create flexibility in lieu of leaving gaps.63 According
to Macneil, long-term contracts are typically regulated by either
of two governance structures: "(1) an explicitly stated contractual
guarantee legally enforced by the government or some other
outside institution [exogenous governance], or (2) an implicit
contractual guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of
withdrawing future business if opportunistic behavior occurs
[endogenous governance]."'
Exogenous governance structures refer disputes to a third party
for adjudication. The third party takes the place of contract
provisions in determining the damages for a breach or the
adaptations that will be made in various circumstances. 6 The
third party can take many forms including an independent
66expert, an arbitration panel, or a judicial proceeding.
In contrast, endogenous governance structures resolve disputes
within the parameters of the contractual arrangement. Third
party involvement is not found in endogenous governance
structures. Rather, the parties rely on each other for problem
solving. The relationship underlying the endogenous governance
structure has been compared to the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma,
where the parties agree to cooperate with each other, forgoing
short-term gains in the interest of long-term cooperation. 67
One way of understanding endogenous governance structures
is through relational contract theory, which was developed by
legal scholars to explain how complex contracts address uncertain-
ties and resolve disputes. 68  Fundamentally, relational contract
63 See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 865.
" Klein et al., Appropriable Rents, supra note 22, at 303.
65 See KREPs, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 39, at 750.
66 See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 866, for a discussion of the
role of the architect under the form contracts of the American Institute of
Architects as an example of direct third-party determination of performance.
67 See KREPS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 39, at 751.
68 For a review of relational contract theory, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for
a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983); Stewart Macaulay, An
Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 465; Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 482; Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
10131996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
theory recognizes that elements of certain contracts cannot easily
be reduced to specific obligations ex ante. Obstacles include the
inability to identify future conditions and the inability to
adequately characterize complex adaptations, even when contin-
gencies can be identified in advance.69 In these cases, relational
contract theory suggests that parties attempt to address uncertain-
ties and resolve disputes within the parameters of their ongoing
relationship.70 Relational contract theory views the contractual
relationship as dynamic, in contrast to classical contract law which
views it as static:
71
The fundamental insight of relational contract theory is
that most private exchange occurs within ongoing relation-
ships between parties, rather than the discrete transactional
environment assumed in classical and neoclassical contrac-
tual theory.... In relational contracts, discrete practices,
like breach and litigation, have been replaced by adjust-
ment within social and political processes largely separate
from the positive legal institutions of the state.72
Finally, if transaction costs are severe, unified governance
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Robert E.
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005
(1987) [hereinafter Scott, Conflict].
69 See Charles S. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981).
70 For a theoretic analysis of cooperation in long-term contracts, see Scott,
Conflict, supra note 68, at 2005.
71 Macneil also notes that the relational contract theory is different from
the model described by neoclassical contract law:
In the neoclassical system, the reference point for those questions
about the change tends to be the original agreement. In a truly
relational approach the reference point is the entire relation as it had
developed at the time of the change in question (and in many
instances, as it has developed since the change). This may or may not
include an "original agreement;" and if it does, may or may not result
in great deference being given it.
Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 890.
72 Keith A. Palzer, Comment, Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign
Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 728-30 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
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structures begin to emerge.7 3 In a unified governance structure,
market transactions give way to the firm's internal transfers.7 4
"In particular, when it is too costly for one party to specify a long
list of the particular rights it desires over another party's assets,
then it may be optimal for the first party to purchase all rights
except those specifically mentioned in the contract." 5
The concept of vertical integration is most closely associated
with the unified governance structure. Vertical integration occurs
when a party places its assets under the control of another
party.7 6 It involves "the elimination of contractual or market
exchanges, and the substitution of internal exchanges within the
boundaries of the firm."' By replacing market transfers with
internal transfers, vertical integration minimizes transaction costs.
In summary, transaction cost economics identifies the existence
71 Williamson, however, notes that "[t]he contention that transaction cost
economizing is the main factor responsible for decisions to integrate does not
preclude that there are other factors, several of which sometimes operate
simultaneously." WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL-
ISM, supra note 34, at 103.
' According to Coase,
[o]utside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place
of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is
substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs a production.
It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating produc-
tion.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 28, at 333.
" Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,
716 (1986).
76 The paradigmatic example of vertical integration is the 1926 merger of
Fisher Body and General Motors. See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as
Organizational Ownership: The FisherBody-General Motors Relationship Revisited,
4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988). For an example of vertical integration in the
aerospace industry, see Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Production:
Evidincefrom the Aerospace Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1984).
1 Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 185 (R. Schmalensee & R.D.
Willig eds., 1989); see also Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical
Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational
Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32
EMORY L. J. 1009 (1983) (discussing a synthesis of contract law theory,
economics, and organization theory as applied to specific issues surrounding the
antitrust law of vertical restraints).
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of transaction costs in contractual arrangements and evaluates their
impact. It suggests that contractual arrangements are typically
incomplete because of transaction costs. As a result, the parties
may face costly adjustments to address unforeseen contingencies.
Alternatively, one party may seek to extract quasi-rents from
other parties through opportunistic behavior. Transaction cost
economics also suggests that the presence and intensity of
transaction costs explain the variation in the governance structure
of contractual arrangements.
3. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
The principles of transaction cost economics apply with equal
rigor at the international level.7" "Virtually any relation, eco-
nomic or otherwise, that takes the form of or can be described as
a contracting problem can be evaluated to advantage in transaction
cost terms."7 9 Like firms engaged in private contractual relations,
states are involved in the negotiation and implementation of
contractual arrangements. These arrangements are also subject to
transaction costs."0 States cannot make exhaustive agreements
that address every contingency that may arise in the course of
their relationship. These negotiations would take many years, and
the cost of such negotiations would be prohibitive." States also
lack the information necessary to consider adequately all potential
risk factors and developments.
The consequences of transaction costs on international
institutions are twofold. First, states may face costly adjustments
7' For examples of how political science scholars have consistently applied
economic theory to the study of international relations, see KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY, supra note 11, at 27-29; KENNETH WALTZ, THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICs 89-93 (1979); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of
International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25, 31 (1985).
79 WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 387.
80 See George Ress, Ex Ante Safeguards Against Ex Post Opportunism in
International Treaties: Theory and Practice of International Public Law, 150 J.
INST. & THEOR. ECON. 279, 292-93 (1994).
81 Multilateral negotiations often take many years to complete. For
example, negotiations for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention lasted eight
years. Negotiations for the Uruguay Round Agreements took seven years. See
Aceves, Lost Sovereignty?, supra note 12, at 427; William J. Aceves, The Freedom
of Navigation Program, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 268 (1996).
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to address unforeseen contingencies. Second, states may seek to
extract quasi-rents from other states through opportunistic
behavior. Thus, the development and operation of international
institutions may be affected by the presence of transaction costs.
While states may be interested in developing institutions that
promote cooperation, transaction costs may affect the develop-
ment and operation of these institutions.
As already mentioned, transaction cost economics suggests that
four governance structures develop in response to transaction
costs: market, exogenous, endogenous, and unified governance.1
2
The discrete nature of market governance structures precludes
their application to international agreements. Unlike domestic
contractual arrangements where the specific identity of the parties
may be insignificant, there are few, if any, international transac-
tions where identities are of negligible importance. From security
arrangements to economic accords, the identity of member states
is an integral component of each agreement.
Similarly, the unified governance structure is inapplicable to
most international agreements which, by their nature, apply
between sovereign states.83 States fiercely protect their sovereign-
ty and are hesitant to cede control to another state. Thus, gover-
nance structures at the international level typically involve either
12 See WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 72-78. Friedrich Kratochwil suggested a comparable approach when
he examined regimes and transaction costs. See Friedrich Kratochwil, Contract
and Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter?, in REGIME
HEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1995).
Kratochwil distinguished five forms of contracts: the spot contract, the spot
contract with sequential performance, the simple incomplete contract, thecomplex long-term contract, and a contract imposing obligations concerning an
ongoing relationship. He suggested that regimes come closest to long-term
incomplete contracts. 
See id. at 76.
3 Several forms of unified governance structures, however, have been
suggested in international affairs. See GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN,
WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (3d ed. 1966); INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.,
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255-71 (1962); KARL W. DEUTSCH
ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA (1957).
Empires may also be viewed as a form of unified governance structure. See,
e.g., MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 12 (1986) (arguing that an empire is "a
system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the
dominant metropole exerts political control over the internal and external
policy - the effective sovereignty - of the other, the subordinate periphery");
JACK SNYDER, MYTHS OF EMPIRE (1991) (providing domestic explanations for
the rise and fall of empires).
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exogenous or endogenous arrangements. This section examines
how these two mechanisms function at the international level.
3.1. Exogenous Governance Structures
Exogenous governance structures address the problems raised
by transaction costs by authorizing a third party to address any
disputes or unforeseen developments that may arise in the course
of the relationship. The third party acts as an independent actor
with no interest in the substantive matter of the parties' relation-
ship. Exogenous structures can take several forms, including
arbitration and judicial settlement.84
Exogenous governance structures apply the basic rules of the
game to the myriad of unanticipated contingencies and disputes
that may arise in the relationship." The inherent flexibility of
these structures is one of their more powerful attributes. These
structures can administer the rules developed by the parties,
monitor adherence to these rules, and publicize transgressions.86
In order to succeed, the parties must recognize the binding nature
of the decisions made by exogenous structures.
3.1.1. The European Union
The European Union's ("EU") legal system is illustrative of an
exogenous governance structure in international affairs.8" Since
For a detailed analysis of international dispute settlement, see J.G.
MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2d ed. 1991); DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Karin Oellers-Frahm &
Norbert Wiihler eds., 1984).
85 Exogenous governance structures have been identified in a wide variety
of settings throughout history. For an example of exogenous structures in
medieval trade, see Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and
Enforcement The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994);
Paul Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. AND POL. 1 (March
1990).
86 See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and
Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS
& FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173,
179, 197 audith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
87 For an analysis of different aspects of the EU legal system, see generally
GORDON SLYNN, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER (1992)
(describing several facets of the EU legal system); G. Federico Mancini, The
Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595, 595 (1989)
(arguing that the European Community is a "peculiar form of international
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its inception in 1957, the EU's legal system has played a decisive
role in the development of European integration.88 The system
consists of the national courts of member states, the Court of
First Instance, and the European Court of Justice.89 If disputes
arise in the interpretation of EU law, national courts are autho-
rized to adjudicate the matter.9' In their analysis, national courts
must recognize the supremacy of European law over inconsistent
national law.9' Alternatively, if the matter involves disputes
between member states or an EU institution (i.e., the European
Commission, the European Parliament, or the Council of
Ministers), the European Court of Justice adjudicates such
matters.92 In either case, the European Court of Justice acts as
the final arbiter of matters pertaining to European law.93
The EU legal system functions as an exogenous governance
structure for two reasons. First, members of the EU recognize
the primacy of European law over national law. Second, the EU
judiciary is empowered to adjudicate any matters pertaining to the
EU. Thus, the EU legal system acts as an ex ante safeguard to ex
organization [with a]... unique institutional structure and... unprecedented
law-making and judicial powers"); J.H.H. Weiler, Journey to an Unknown
Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in
the Arena of Political Integration, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 417, 419 (1993)
( "Under the doctrinal perspective the political institutions of the Community
(Commission, Council, Parliament) the governments of the Member States (and
other actors within Member States), transnational interests and organizations
constitute each, and together, objects of the Court's jurisprudence."); J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) [hereinafter
Weiler, Transformation] (examining the development of the relationship
between the EU and member states and the role of the EU legal structure).
T 1 For a general description of the European Union, see NEILL NUGENT,
THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989);
Weiler, Transformation, supra note 87, at 2403.
au See NUGENT, supra note 88, at 229-32. The Single European Act of 1986
authorized The Court of First Instance to assist the European Court of justice
in handling its case load. See id. at 162.
91 See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 86 (2d ed. 1988); SLYNN, supra note 87, at 9.
91 The notion of supremacy was first enunciated by the European Court
of justice in Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL 1964 ECR 585. See Eric Stein, Lawyers,
jud, es and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11 6981)."" " "
92 See SLYNN, supra note 87, at 9.
93 See NUGENT, supra note 88, at 220-28.
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post opportunism. 4
In International Cooperation and Institutional Choice, Geoffrey
Garrett examines the role of the European Community's ("EC")
legal system in the development of the EC's internal market as
embodied in the 1987 Single European Act.95 According to
Garrett, the decision to complete the European internal market by
1992 "may represent the most ambitious instance of multilateral
cooperation since the construction of the post-World War II
international order." Garrett argues that the EC legal system
played an important role in the successful implementation of the
internal market. Specifically, the EC legal system mitigated the
monitoring and incomplete contracting problems facing member
states.
97
As a preliminary matter, Garrett identifies the implications of
transaction costs on international agreements. He states that
conventional analyses of cooperation assume that community
94 Ress, supra note 80, at 298-300 ("[T]he primacy of European Community
law and the idea of the direct applicability of EEC Treaty provisions and
secondary EEC law may be considered as first steps against ex-post opportun-
ism.").
11 Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The
European Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533 (1992) [hereinafter
Garrett, Cooperation]. Garrett wrote this article before the EC became the EU.
96 Id. at 533. According to Article 8a of the Single European Act, "[t]he
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty." Single European Act, 1 TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1005 (Office for Official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, 1987). For a description of the develop-
ment of the Single European Act, see THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 214-27 (William Wallace ed., 1990); THE NEW EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Robert 0.
Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991); Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the
Single European Act National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the
European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991); Wayne Sandholtz & John
Zysman, 1992: Recasting the European Bargain, 42 WORLD POL. 95 (1989).
' See Garrett, Cooperation, supra note 95, at 557. For an alternative
analysis of the EC legal system, see Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe
Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993)
[hereinafter Burley & Mattli, Before the Court]. See also Geoffrey Garrett, The
Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT'L ORG. 171 (1995)
(challenging the Burley and Mattli critique of the neorationalist explanation of
legal interpretation); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics
in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT'L ORG. 183 (1995)
[hereinafter Mattli & Slaughter, A Reply] (responding to Garrett's critique on
the development of legal integration).
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members will agree on a comprehensive set of rules to govern all
future interactions ex ante, and that compliance with and trans-
gressions of these rules will be obvious.9 Garrett recognized,
however, that both assumptions are often unwarranted.
One significant problem faced by EC states in monitoring
compliance with EC obligations is the requirement that each
participant know a great deal about the past behavior of the
others for cooperation to evolve. The existence of multiple actors
decreases the probability that states will know enough about the
past behavior of other actors to make informed strategic choic-
es.99 Garrett indicates that such uncertainty could inhibit the
emergence of cooperation in the European Community: "Given
the multitude and complexity of interactions in the EC .. .it is
a practical impossibility for all governments to know precisely
whether actors have transgressed common agreements in the
past."'°° Since rule violations could not be effectively identified,
there would be signficant incentives to transgress such rules.
An additional impediment facing EC members is the problem
of incomplete contracting. Exhaustive agreements that anticipate
disputes in advance are costly, if not impossible.10 While EC
members recognized the benefits of agreeing ex ante on the set of
rules to govern every possible contingency, such action was
infeasible.
Garrett suggests that the EC legal system resolved these two
fundamental problems. First, the EC legal system established a
monitoring system to ensure compliance with EC legislation. The
legal system was authorized to adjudicate matters pertaining to the
European Community, and both public and private parties were
authorized to bring lawsuits to enforce EC legislation. According
to Garrett, a legal system that regulates the behavior of partici-
pants and identifies transgressions of agreed upon rules contributes
to the force of cooperative agreements. 02 Second, the members
98 See Garrett, Cooperation, supra note 95, at 557.
99 See id. at 539.
100 Id. at 557.
101 See id.
102 See id. Garrett recognized that,
[i]nstitutions that monitor the behavior of parties to a cooperative
agreement and identify their transgressions are likely to be vital to the
retaliatory and reputational processes that undergird the logic of the
iterated prisoners' dilemma. In the context of the EC, therefore, one
1996] 1021
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j Int'l Econ. L.
of the European Community recognized the limitations of purely
legislative efforts to address every possible future contingency.
Rather than attempting to do this, they made agreements that
only sketched the broad "rules of the game."103 The EC legal
system, including the courts of member states and the European
Court of Justice, then applied and adapted these rules to specific
cases. 1 4  Accordingly, Garrett indicates that "[t]he EC legal
system provides a mechanism through which the types of general
agreements about the rules of the game supplied by the EC
treaties and internal market directives can be applied to the
myriad interactions that constitute the EC economy."05
Through this process, the EU legal system acts as an exogenous
governance structure to minimize the problems raised by
transaction costs at the international level.
3.2. Endogenous Governance Structure
In contrast to exogenous governance structures, endogenous
structures allow states to address the problems raised by transac-
tion costs within the context of their relationship. Unlike
exogenous structures, endogenous structures do not rely upon a
third party or other outside mechanism to resolve disputes.
Rather, disputes are resolved by the parties within the course of
their relationship.0 6
The concept of endogenous governance structures is consistent
could have expected that the establishment of institutions for
overcoming incomplete information problems would have been an
essential component of moves to complete the internal market.
Id. at 54041 (citation omitted).
103 Id. at 557.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 558. In their analysis of legal integration in the European
Community, Mattli and Slaughter agree that *"the member states of the
European Community, like parties to any international bargain, would refer
a functioning court to resolve disputes, fill in missing contract terms, andhold
parties to their word. Such preferences keep courts in business the world over,
domestically and internationally." Mattli & Slaughter, A Reply, supra note 97,
at 184. They disagree, however, on the judicial decision-making process and the
nature of state interests that the European Court of Justice takes into account.
See id.
'06 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The
Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 1. INST. & THEOR. EcON. 286
(1993) (discussing constitutions as examples of endogenous governance
structures).
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with transaction cost economics, which recognizes the advantages
of informal structures over more formal and structured mecha-
nisms for dispute settlement.07 Indeed, endogenous governance
is "based on empirical evidence and growing sentiment among
legal scholars and practitioners that legal centralism places far too
much emphasis on formal written contracts and their effective
adjudication in courts of law."10 8  Rather, transaction cost
economics focuses "on 'private ordering' and the concept of
'contract as framework.""'1 9  Unlike formal adjudication, infor-
mal governance structures are not confrontational in nature. By
emphasizing the relationship, they encourage cooperation rather
than conflict. Informal structures are also more flexible than the
adjudicatory process. They offer a quicker solution than more
formalized dispute settlement mechanisms can provide.
107 The concept of endogenous governance structures is also consistent with
the concept of tacit bargaining, which recognizes the advantages of informal
practice over formal negotiations. See GEORGE W. DowNs & DAVID M.
ROcKE, TAcIT BARGAINING, ARMS RACES, AND ARMS CONTROL (1990). As
Downs and Rocke state:
[t]acit bargaining takes place whenever a state attempts to influence the
policy choices of another state through behavior, rather than by
relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges. The process is
tacit ecause actions, rather than rhetoric, constitute the critical
medium of communication. It is bargaining and not coercion because
the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only be
achieved through some measure of joint voluntary behavior.
Id. at 3.
Tacit bargaining has several advantages over more formal behavior. For
example, formal negotiations are often lengthy and complex. In addition,
formal negotiations have difficulty coping with constantly evolving environ-
ments. In particular, formal negotiations cannot handle technological
innovations as well as tacit bargaining. On the other hand, "[t]acit bargaining
is flexible enough to permit the-kind of dynamic adjustments that are necessary
to cope with changes in technology and leadership." Id. at 14.
Tacit bargaining, however, also faces certain limitations. The actions of
tacit bargaining are potentially more costly than the talk of formal negotiations.
In addition, "[t]acit bargaining by its very nature changes the status quo and,
when unsuccessful, produces a situation that is less desirable from the
standpoint of one or both parties." Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
Endogenous governance structures are also consistent with common pool
resource management described by Ostrom. See OSTROM, supra note 12, at 15-
21, 88-102.
108 Yarbrough & Yarbrough, Institutions, supra note 23, at 255. In addition,
"formal structures represent only one part of the network or web of
interactions that comprise politicaland economic behavior." Id. at 257.
109 Id. at 255 (citation omitted).
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The concept of endogenous governance structures is also
consistent with relational contract theory. In these types of
contracts, "discrete practices, like breach and litigation, have been
replaced by adjustment within social and political processes largely
separate from the positive legal institutions of the state."1 '
Gidon Gottlieb criticizes the approach of traditional legal theory
which suggests that sustained relationships require exogenous
pressure to ensure compliance, stating, "[t]his point of view is
incomplete and fails to explain how the rules function as rules for
the entities that are engaged in sustained and durable relation-
ships.""'
In Understanding Dynamic Obligations, Edwin Smith examines
the development of endogenous governance structures in the realm
of arms control.112 Specifically, Smith examines the develop-
ment of arms control agreements between the United States and
the former Soviet Union that established dynamic obligations
between the parties.13 These agreements were structured to
create evolving commitments and to allow consensual changes in
the obligations imposed in order to fulfill the object of the treaty
in uncertain or unpredictable conditions. They forego the use of
exogenous structures to resolve disputes or address unforeseen
contingencies. Rather, these agreements facilitate the ability of the
parties to address unforeseen contingencies and resolve disputes as
they arise.
According to Smith, international cooperation is difficult to
achieve because states face both the collective action problem and
uncertainty. 4  The collective action problem reduces the
likelihood of international cooperation because states will seek to
maximize individual welfare even at the expense of joint gains."'
Specifically, the collective action problem suggests that rational,
self-interested actors will not contribute to cooperative action if
they are able to reap the benefits of cooperation without contrib-
uting to its development." 6 In addition, parties to international
110 Palzer, supra note 72, at 730 (citation omitted).
"' Gottlieb, supra note 68, at 574.
112 Smith, supra note 6.
... See id. at 1560.
114 See id. at 1559.
115 See id.
116 See OLSON, supra note 12, at 14-16.
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agreements face numerous uncertainties in drafting their agree-
ments.117 First, economic and technological conditions are likely
to change as the agreement evolves. Although states may predict
gains from cooperation, "they cannot evaluate the character of
those gains because of uncertainty about the course of economics
or technology.""' Second, states may lack important informa-
tion relative to the agreement. 19 Third, states may be uncertain
as to the level of risk they face.120 Fourth, while states may
recognize the advantages of cooperation, they may be uncertain
regarding how to coordinate their efforts.12 ' In each of these
situations, uncertainty complicates the problem of coordinating
collective action in response to shared risks.'2
Smith suggests that "[f]ormal agreements that create dynamic
obligations provide one mechanism for coping with the combina-
tion of uncertainty and collective action problems."" 3  These
agreements are structured to create evolving commitments and
provide for consensual changes in the obligations imposed in order
to satisfy the purpose of the treaty in uncertain conditions. 4
Specifically, "[d]ynamic obligations arise under agreements that
allow the parties to mutually adjust commitments while maintain-
ing a shared perception of reciprocal responsibility."1" The
formal nature of the agreement increases the binding character of
the commitment.12 6  The dynamic nature of the agreement
encourages cooperation, even after the original terms of the
agreement prove to be inadequate."
In developing the concept of dynamic obligations, Smith refers
to analogous arrangements in the fields of domestic contract law
and international relations: relational contract theory and the
117 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1557-559.
11 Id. at 1557.
19 See id. at 1558.
120 See id.
12 See id. at 1559.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 1560.
124 See id. at 1557.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 1560, 1574.
127 See id. at 1560.
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theory of international regimes. 12' Relational contract theory
emphasizes the importance of the underlying relationship in the
contractual setting and suggests that parties will seek to resolve
disputes informally rather than through the legal process. 129
Smith suggests that "theories of domestic law developed to
distinguish long-term, interactive relational contracts from
contracts that involve a discrete transaction contribute to the
analysis of treaties that create dynamic obligations." 3 ' Similarly,
the theory of international regimes describes how regularized
patterns of state behavior can facilitate cooperation among egoistic
actors in a decentralized international system.13' Regimes are
defined as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making proce-
dures around which actor expectations converge .. ,132 They
increase the likelihood of cooperation by generating predictable
patterns of behavior.'33 According to Smith, regimes provide a
foundation for the development of dynamic obligations at the
international level. When regimes develop "treaties generating
dynamic obligations may provide the most appropriate formalized
statements that can be constructed, because they allow the
development of custom, usage and practice. "134 Through the
formal and informal network developed by international regimes,
the development of dynamic relations is facilitated.
After developing the concept of dynamic obligations, Smith
then applies it to examine several arms control agreements, such
as the agreements resulting from the SALT/START process.
35
12 See id. at 1583-95.
121 See id. at 1587-88.
130 Smith, supra note 6, at 1590.
131 See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(containing several essays which describe the concept of international regimes
from different theoretical views); Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for
International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982) (analyzing regime theory
through a rational choice analysis).
132 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 185 (1982).
133 Specifically, regimes facilitate the development of international
agreements and, therefore, international cooperation By "raising the anticipated
costs of violating others' property rights, by altering transaction costs through
the clustering of issues, and by providing reliable information to members."
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 11, at 97.
134 Smith, supra note 6, at 1593.
13 See id. at 1598.
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The SALT/START arms control agreements did not rely upon an
independent legal system or some form of third-party dispute
settlement. Rather, the dynamic structure of these arms control
agreements replaced the need for exogenous structures.
The success of the SALT/START process can be attributed to
its dynamic character. The parties shared a common understand-
ing of the purpose of their relationship and its related agree-
ments. 36 In addition, the parties developed specific verification
mechanisms to increase their confidence in the agreements. For
example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established the Standing
Consultative Commission ("SCC") to "promote the objectives and
implementation of ... this Treaty."1 37  Its purpose was to
facilitate the exchange of information between the parties and
address any disputes that arise.138 Similarly, the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty established the Special Verification
Commission ("SVC") to "promote the objectives and implementa-
tion of the provisions of this Treaty."139 Its purpose was to
"resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations
136 Id. at 1598.
The regime was based on principles and norms that included a shared
understanding of the need to stabilize strategic parity, the recognition
of the existence of mutual deterrence, the awareness of the likelihood
that unilateral measures would lead to decreased security at greater
cost, and the acceptance of need for a balance between offense and de-
fense.
Id.; see also Condoleezza Rice, SALT and the Search for a Security Regime, in
U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION 293 (Alexander L. George et al. eds.,
1988) (examining the SALT/START process in light of regime theory).
137 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XIII, para. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3444; see also Memoran-
dum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative
Commission, Dec. 21, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 239 (describing
Commissioners' goals); Standing Consultative Commission Protocol, May 30,
1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 1124 (noting the establishment of Regulations for
the Commission).
138 See generally Robert W. Buchheim & Philip J. Farley, The U.S.-Soviet
Standing Consultative Commission, in U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION,
supra note 136, 254 (explaining the history and purpose of the SCC); Sidney N.
Graybeal & Michael Krepon, Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative
Commission, 10 INT'L SEC. 183 (1985) (describing SCC's mandate and
operations).
139 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XIII, para. 1, 27 I.L.M. 84, 97 (entered
into force June 1, 1988).
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assumed; and... agree upon such measures as may be necessary
to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.""
According to Smith, the SALT/START institutional structures
replaced third-party dispute resolution for arms control agree-
ments.141 Interestingly, Williamson viewed the Standing Consul-
tative Commission as an example of an endogenous governance
structure:
142
The SCC is not an independent third party, and it has no
authority with respect to enforcement; rather, it is a forum
in which the two parties can meet to work out ambiguities
stemming from the implementation of arms control
treaties. Plainly the SCC is an instrument of private
ordering, there being no legal forum to which the parties
would be willing to present their concerns and contest
differences.' 43
Smith's analysis of dynamic obligations describes how
endogenous governance structures address the problems of
transaction costs. Unlike formal legal commitments that have
difficulty responding to the uncertainty that is inherent in
international affairs, dynamic obligations establish networks of
related and mutually reinforcing commitments that allow for
flexibility and durability in the international sphere.144  Indeed,
in an area as sensitive as nuclear arms control, states would be
particularly hesitant to recognize the decisions of an exogenous
140 Id. at art. XIII, para. 1, a-b.
141 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1601.
142 See Oliver Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction,
in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES 4 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990).
In this edited volume, several scholars, including Williamson, questioned
whether the firm should continue to be viewed as a nexus of contracts. They
viewed this perception as unduly rigid. It suggested a legal centralism to con-
tractual relations that did not really exist and also emphasized the role of legal
sanctions over private ordering. These scholars suggested replacing the term
"nexus of contract" with "nexus of treaty": "The substitution of the term treaty
for contract brings private ordering forcefully to the fore." Id. But see
Yarbrough & Yarbrough, International Contracting, supra note 23, at 242
(calling contracts legally enforceable agreements).
143 Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, supra note
142, at 4 (citation omitted).
144 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1605-06.
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institution. As Smith notes, "parties to arms control agreements
will not rely upon dispute resolution by neutral tribunals."14
3.3. Summary
Both exogenous and endogenous governance structures address
the problems raised by transaction costs. However, the develop-
ment of exogenous structures at the international level suffers
from several limitations. First, an exogenous structure requires
states to cede certain levels of sovereignty to a third party. In a
decentralized international system states are reluctant to take such
action.146  The Prisoners' Dilemma reveals how the structural
constraints of a decentralized system can lead states to fear the
consequences of defection by other states.' 47 As a result, states
will be reluctant to enter into agreements which require the
transfer of sovereignty or limit their freedom of action. Second,
an exogenous governance structure requires a formal and sophisti-
cated mechanism to function effectively. Effective management
of such a complex and tightly coupled system, however, is often
difficult to achieve.148  Third, if a neutral third party issues a
ruling, it may still require the offending party take action to
correct its own behavior. Even those treaties that afford a
"independent third party or organ (arbitration or court) to settle
disputes, by rendering a binding interpretation of a disputed treaty
clause of provisions, are not always able to yield a conclusive
145 Id. at 1551.
146 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 328-46 (6th
ed. 1985).
I4 See generally ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 27-30 (1989)
(describing the Prisoners' Dilemma as a noncooperative game with conflict);
John A.C. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International
Political Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5 (1984) (applying Prisoners' Dilemma
analysis to international trade issues); Joanne Gowa, Anarchy, Egoism and Third
Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG.
167 (1986) (reviewing Axelrod's book The Evolution of Cooperation, supra note
15, and its implications for international cooperation); Robert Jervis, Coopera-
tion Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167 (1978) (applying
Prisoners' Dilemma analysis to international security).
148 See generally Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Limits of International Organiza-
tion: Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations, 45 INT'L
ORG. 183 (1991) (examining flaws and failures inherent in the management of
international organizationsj; see also EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE
BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
(1996) (describing unforeseen consequences of technological advances).
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solution."149 Thus, the determination of legal liability does not
automatically resolve disputes. Fourth, exogenous responses may
give rise to retaliation by the punished state. Accordingly, states
must consider the costs of such retaliation.150 For these reasons,
it has been suggested that treaties should be drafted in a way that
allows for self-implementation without the need for control
measures such as subsequent enforcement.'51  Endogenous
governance structures do not suffer from these limitations.
Unlike exogenous structures, endogenous structures do not rely
upon a third party. Rather, they encourage parties to resolve
disputes and address unforeseen contingencies within the course
of their relationship. This method is consistent with transaction
cost economics, which recognizes the importance of informal
institutions in resolving problems of transaction costs. 52 Infor-
mal institutions are preferable to formal legal structures, which
may be incomplete and misleading due to a lack of effective
enforcement of rules assumed by the formal approach. 53
Indeed, Williamson recognized the need for such specialized
governance structures within treaties:
The limits of legal centralism being so transparent for
treaties - since the parties may refuse a legal forum and/or
ignore legal sanctions - there is a clear need from the
outset for the parties to craft specialized governance
structures within which to embed a treaty.
15 4
149 Ress, supra note 80, at 293.
150 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 26, at 105; AXELROD, EVOLUTION,
supra note 15, at 183. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes add that "in bilateral
relationships like arms control and trade, the risk of setting off 'a long echo of
alternating retaliations' will often dwarf the consequences of overlooking what
are arguably relatively minor or 'technical' violations." CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 26, at 105 (footnote omitted).
.51 See Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, supra
note 142, at 4.
152 See id. at 164-66; see also Joskow, supra note 53, at 39 (stating that
transaction cost economics recognizes "that there is a strong incentive to
structure contracts to minimize reliance on the legal system (which is costly
and confronts grave difficulties in distinguishing promised behavior from 'bad
behavior')").
153 See Yarbrough & Yarbrough, Institutions, supra note 23, at 257.
154 Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, supra note
142, at 4.
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While exogenous governance structures can play a role in
mitigating the problems raised by transaction costs, endogenous
structures are the focus of this article.
4. STATE PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A fundamental principle of international law facilitates the
development of endogenous governance structures - the concept
of state practice. The concept of state practice is found in the two
principal sources of international law: customary international
law and treaty law."'5
4.1. Customary International Law
According to international law, continuous and long-standing
state practice may develop into customary international law and
be considered legally binding on those states that acquiesce in its
formation and development.
1 16
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
1"5 In addition to customary international law and treaty law, there are
several other sources of international law. Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
f the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
subject to the provision of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide
a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
I.C.J. Statute, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. But see Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither
Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEx.
INT'L L. J. 87 (1991) (noting the failure of academics to acknowledge a third
source of international law).
116 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing the elements and effects of custom);
BRIERLY, supra note 27, at 59-62 (detaiing the ubiquitous role of custom); Josef
L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 662-69
(1953) (examining early attempts in the literature to address the problems
inherent to acknowledging customary internatonal law).
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Justice defines international custom as "evidence of a general
practice accepted as law."1 57  According to the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restate-
ment"), "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."'58 The basis of customary international law, there-
fore, is the notion "that states in and by their international
practice may implicitly consent to the creation and application of
international legal rules."1 59  Customary international law can
arise in three separate contexts: it can develop to create new
international law, supersede prior customary law, or supersede
prior treaty law.'6°
The sources of customary international law are found in state
practice."" The numerous sources of custom include: diplomat-
157 I.C.J. Statute, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
1"9 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (2d
ed. 1993). Several scholars have criticized the traditional definition and
approach of customary international law. See W. Michael Reisman, The Cult
of Custom in the Late 20th Centuy, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133 (1987); Phillip
R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 665 (1986).
160 See, e.g., NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF
TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).
For a discussion of the influence of international agreements in the develop-
ment of customary international law, see Jonathan I. Charney, International
Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 971 (1986).
161 MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATION-
AL LAW 25-26 (6th ed. 1987).
It is recognized that general demonstrations of a state's legal position are
sufficient to establish a iule of customary international law. See Michael
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
2-3 (1977). Some scholars and jurists, however, have argued that only physical
acts constitute state practice which would influence the development of a
customary norm of international law. Thus, diplomatic statements and other
non-physical acts are insufficient to affect the development of customary
international law. Anthony D'Amato has argued that "[w]hen a rule is alleged
to be a rule of 'custom,' the person asserting the rule must adduce a qualitative
articulation of the rule and[a quantitative element as well." ANTHONY A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1971)
[hereinafter D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM]. Indeed, while diplomatic
claims may articulate a legal norm, they cannot constitute the material
component of custom. "For a state has not done anything when it makes a
claim; until it takes enforcement action, the claim has little value as a prediction
of what the state will actually do." Id. at 88. In his dissent of the Anglo-
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ic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions
of legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, executive
decisions and practices, orders to naval forces, international and
national judicial decisions, treaty provisions, and other interna-
tional obligations. 16 2 The Restatement notes that the practice of
states may include diplomatic acts and instructions, public
measures, other governmental acts, and official statements of
policy, whether such acts and statements are independent or
undertaken in cooperation with other states.1 63 In addition to
these traditional sources, omission and silence may be considered
relevant in the development of customary international law. State
inaction may imply ratification through acquiescence. 61  The
decisions of both the Permanent Court of International Justice
("PCIJ") and the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") suggest that
the failure of a state to take certain action may be deemed relevant
in determining the status of customary international law.165
Norwegian Fisheries case, Judge Read of the ICJ stated:
Customary international law is the generalization of the Practice of
States. This cannot be established by citing cases where coastal States
have made extensive claims, but have not maintained their claims by
the actual assertion of sovereignty over trespassing foreign ships ...
The only convincing evidence of State practice is to be found in
seizures, where the coastal State asserts its sovereignty over trespassing
ships.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116, 191 (Dec. 18); see
also MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES,
4-9 (1985) (explaining that verbal expressions alone are insufficient to forge state
practice). Despite these assertions attesting to the primacy of physical acts over
other demonstrative actions, this view remains the minority position.
162 See BROWNUE, supra note 156, at 5. The ICJ has noted that the form
of the protest is not decisive and that "the sole relevant question is whether the
language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear intention."
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.CJ. 17, 32 (May 26).
163 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, S 102 cmt. b. The International Law
Commission identified the following as evidence of customary international
law: texts of international instruments, decisions of international courts,
decisions of national courts, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence,
opinions of national legal advisers and the practice of international organiza-
tions. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 368-72, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/ser.A/1950/Add.1.
164 See VILLIGER, supra note 161, at 18-20; Akehurst, Custom as a Source of
International Law, supra note 161, at 9-10 (1977); I.C. MacGibbon, Customary
International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 118-19 (1958).
161 In the Lotus case, the PCIJ examined whether Turkey could exercise
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a French citizen for acts committed on the
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There are two principal elements to customary international
law. First, state practice must be consistent. Second, state
practice must develop out of a sense of legal obligation.
4.1.1. Consistency of State Practice
Consistency of state practice is essential for the development
of customary international law. The emphasis on consistency is
based on the notion that customary international law depends
upon its regular observance in practice.
166
The ICJ examined the relevance of consistency in the develop-
ment of customary international law in the Asylum case. 67 In
this case, a Peruvian political leader sought and received political
asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. Peru, however,
refused to recognize his classification as a political refugee by the
Colombian government. After diplomatic negotiations failed to
resolve the crisis, the matter was referred to the ICJ.1
68
In proceedings before the ICJ, Colombia argued that, as the
state granting asylum, it "[wa]s competent to qualify the nature of
the offense by a unilateral decision binding on Peru."169 Colom-
bia based this assertion on several international agreements and on
customary international law." ° Specifically, it invoked "Ameri-
can international law in general," arguing the existence of a
high seas. Specifically, the Court looked to whether customary law authorized
Turkey to exercise such jurisdiction. In its analysis, the Court indicated that
state inaction could give rise to a customary norm of international law. Lotus
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7). In the Nottebohm case,
Liechtenstein sought to exercise its jurisdiction on behalf of a naturalized
citizen against Guatemala before the International Court of Justice. Guatemala
challenged the proceedings, arguing that there were insufficient contacts
between Liechtenstein and the naturalized citizen that would authorize
Liechtenstein's exercise of jurisdiction. In its analysis, the Court examined state
practice to determine whether Liechtenstein's assertion of jurisdiction was
appropriate. The Court held that Liechtenstein could not extend its protection
to the citizen in this case. The Court based its decision, in part, on "[t]he
practice of certain States which refrain from exercising protection." Nottebohm
(Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. 4, at 22 (Apr. 6).
166 The duration, frequency, uniformity, and generality of a practice
provide evidence of consistency. See BROWNLIE, supra note 156, at 5-6.
167 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266 (Nov. 20).
168 See id.
169 Id. at 274.
170 Colombia referred to the 1928 Havana Convention on Asylum and the
1933 Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum. See id. at 275, 276.
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regional custom peculiar to Latin-American states."'
In its analysis, the ICJ noted that a party that relies on a
custom must prove: (1) that it is established in such a manner
that it has become binding on the other party, and (2) that the
rule is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced
by the states in question. 2 After examining state practice in
the realm of diplomatic asylum, the ICJ refused to acknowledge
that the Colombian position had developed into a customary rule
of international law. According to the ICJ:
The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose
so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctua-
tion and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum
and in the official views expressed on various occasions,
there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succes-
sion of conventions on asylum ratified by some States and
rejected by others, and the practice has been so much
influenced by considerations of political expediency in the
various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this
any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with
regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive
qualification of the offence. 73
Thus, the ICJ concluded that the Colombian government failed to
prove the existence of a customary rule of international law.
In addition, the ICJ indicated that even if a customary rule of
international law had developed, Peru could not be bound by such
a rule:
But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed
between certain Latin-American States only, it could not
be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its
attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it
by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo Conventions
of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule
171 Id. at 276.
172 See id. at 276-77.
173 Id. at 277.
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concerning the qualification of the offence in matters of
diplomatic asylum. 4
Thus, the ICJ ruled that "Colombia, as the State granting
asylum, is not competent to qualify the offence by a unilateral and
definitive decision, binding on Peru."17 s This analysis suggests
that the development of customary international law may be
successfully challenged by states that continuously object to its
formation.17 6  When the acts of some states encounter protests
from other states, these acts and protests often cancel each other
out.
177
Lassa Oppenheim defines protest as "a formal communication
from one State to another that it objects to an act performed, or
contemplated, by the latter."17' I.C. MacGibbon provides a
more elaborate definition which describes a protest as:
[A] formal objection by which the protesting State makes
it known that it does not recognize the legality of the acts
against which the protest is directed, that it does not
acquiesce in the situation which such acts have created or
which they threaten to create, and that it has no intention
174 See id. at 278. The ICJ acknowledged that a special custom can develop
among a small group of states. See id.
Whereas general customary law applies to all states, special custom applies
to a limited group of states. Examples of special custom include
nongeneralizable topics such as title to territorial areas or rules expressly limited
to countries of a certain region. See generally D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 161, at 234-36 (comparing general and special customary
law); Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in International
Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1969) (explaining World Court decisions in
relation to the differences between general and special customary law).
175 1950 I.CJ. at 278.
176 See VILLIGER, supra note 161, at 15-17; Jonathan I. Charney, The
Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law,
56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26
HARV. INT'L LJ. 457 (1985).
D'Amato has argued that the persistent objector rule only applies in the
case of special custom. See D'AMATo, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 161
at 233-62.
177 See AKEHURST, supra note 161, at 28.
178 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 874 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
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of abandoning its own rights in the premises.179
Thus, a protest serves three purposes: to challenge the
development of customary international law, to enable a state to
escape from being bound by the development of an emerging
norm of international law, and to provide a state with the
opportunity to promote the acceptance of its own viewpoints as
to the proper status of the law 80
The ICJ has acknowledged the use of protest by a state to
successfully challenge the development of customary international
law. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,181 the Norwegian
government promulgated a decree delimiting the Norwegian
fisheries zone. The zone reserved fishing rights exclusively for
Norwegian nationals. Numerous incidents occurred in which
British trawlers were detained for fishing in the self-proclaimed
Norwegian zone. After diplomatic negotiations failed to resolve
the matter, it was referred to the ICJ.
In these proceedings, the United Kingdom argued that the
lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone were not
drawn in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.
Specifically, customary international law provided that the length
of any straight lines drawn to determine maritime boundaries
must not exceed ten sea miles. In response, the Norwegian
government argued that its own system of delimitation conformed
with the requirements of international law.182
In its analysis, the ICJ noted that the adoption of the ten-mile
rule was not uniform. Although certain states included the rule
in their national law and in their treaties, and although arbitral
decisions applied it, other states adopted a different limit.183
Thus, the ten-mile rule had not become a rule of customary
international law. Moreover, the ICJ indicated that "[i]n any
event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against
Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply
179 I.C. MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in Internation-
al Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 298 (1953).
180 See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 433-34 (1983).
181 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.Cj. 116 (Dec. 18).
182 See id. at 126.
8 See id. at 131.
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it to the Norwegian coast." 84 Thus, the ICJ held that Norway's
decree deliminating the fisheries zone did not contradict interna-
tional law.'85
4.1.2. Opinio Juris
In addition to the consistency of state practice, the develop-
ment of customary international law requires that states follow
the practice out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).186
The concept of opinio juris provides a qualitative element to the
development of customary international law. As noted in the
Restatement, "a practice that is generally followed but which states
feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary
law."187 Thus, for a state to be bound by the development of a
customary norm of international law, it must knowingly and
willingly accept the developing norm.
The PCIJ first enunciated the doctrine of opinio juris in the
Lotus'88 case. In the Lotus case, a French mail steamer collided
with a Turkish collier, killing eight Turkish citizens. The French
officer responsible for keeping watch on the French steamer was
tried and convicted for negligence by a Turkish court.189 France
immediately protested, arguing that Turkey had no authority to
prosecute the French officer. It challenged Turkey's action as a
violation of international law. Subsequently, the French and
Turkish governments agreed to submit their dispute to the
PCIJ.190
The PCIJ examined "whether there are any rules of interna-
tional law which may have been violated by the prosecution in
184 Id.
185 See id. at 143.
186 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 156, at 7-11 (discussing instances and
examples of obligation); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COuRT 379-81 (rev. ed. 1958)
(noting the difficulty in demonstrating that such obligation exists); Olufemi
Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 501 (1995) (analyzing different characterizations of the"will" of a state).
18 RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 102 cmt. c.
1I Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 9, at 4 (Sept. 7).
189 See id. at 10-12. The French officer was sentenced to 80 days imprison-
ment and a fine. See id. at 11.
190 See id. at 11-12.
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pursuance of Turkish law of Lieutenant Demons."1 91 In these
proceedings, France argued that a customary rule of international
law had developed regarding criminal prosecution over acts
committed aboard vessels on the high seas. Since states had
abstained from exercising jurisdiction over such criminal acts,
France argued that this practice had developed into a customary
norm prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction." The PCIJ found
such evidence of state action insufficient:
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found
among the reported cases were sufficient to prove in point
of fact the circumstance alleged by the Agent for the
French Government, it would merely show that States had
often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal
proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as
being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were
based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain
would it be possible to speak of an international cus-
tom.19
3
The ICJ reiterated the doctrine of opinio juris in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases. 194 In these cases, a dispute arose among
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands regarding the bound-
aries of their respective areas of the continental shelf in the North
Sea. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the principle of
191 Id. at 18.
192 See id. at 21-22.
193 Id. at 28.
194 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 4 (Feb.
20). Similarly, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua, the ICJ noted that:
[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts
concerned 'amount to a settled practice,' but they must be accompa-
nied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either the States taking such
action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved
so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The
need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.'
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.G.J. 14, 108-09 (June
27).
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equidistance for the purpose of maritime boundary delimitation,
as codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf, was a customary rule of international law and, therefore,
applied to Germany. 195 In contrast, Germany argued that the
equidistance method was not a rule of customary international
law. Rather, Germany stated that it "should have a 'just and
equitable share' of the available continental shelf, in proportion to
the length of its coastline or sea-frontage."
196
The ICJ examined whether the equidistance principle for the
delimitation of the continental shelf was applicable to Germany.
First, it noted that Germany had never ratified the 1958 Conven-
tion and, therefore, was not bound by its provisions. Similarly,
the ICJ concluded that Germany had not subsequently manifested
its acceptance of the equidistance delimitation principle. The ICJ
then examined whether the equidistance principle had become a
rule of customary international law, binding on all states. To this
end, it examined state practice:
The essential point in this connection - and it seems
necessary to stress it - is that even if these instances of
action by non-parties to the Convention were much more
numerous than they in fact are, they would not, even in
the aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio
juris; - for in order to achieve this result, two conditions
must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such,
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such
a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
19s The position of Denmark and the Netherlands was:
[T]he use of this method is not in the nature of a merely conventional
obligation, but is, or must now be regarded as involving, a rule that is
part of the corpus, of general international law; - and, like other rules
of general or customary international law, is binding on the Federal
Republic of Germany automatically and independently of any specific
assent, direct or indirect given by the latter.
1969 I.CJ. at 29.
196 Id. at 21.
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necessitatis.97
In other words, states must feel that they are conforming to a
legal obligation. Indeed,
[t]he frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is
not in itself enough. There are many international acts,
e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only
by considerations of courtesy, convenience, or tradition,
and not by any sense of legal duty."198
Applying this principle to the facts of the case, the ICJ deter-
mined that the use of the equidistance principle for the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf had not developed into a rule of
customary international law.199 Thus, the use of the equidis-
tance delimitation principle was not obligatory.
4.1.3. Summary
In summary, state practice plays an integral role in the
development of customary international law. Indeed, the concept
of state practice in the development of customary international
law is consistent with the positivist theory of international law -
states create international law and, therefore, can only be bound
by their consent.0 0
197 Id. at 45.
198 Id.
199 See id. at 46.
200 See, e.g., FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 18-19 (1985) (discussing turn-of-the-century international legal
positivist theories); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 12-13 (1954) (discussing Hugo Grotius' notions of international law);
Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 691, 719
(1957) (describing the development of positive international law); Roberto Ago,
Positivism, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (1984)
(defining positivism); L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task
and Method, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 332-33 (1908) (distinguishing international
law, which must be consented to, and municipal law, which can be imposed
from above).
This position is by no means uncontroverted. Several scholars have
questioned the role of state consent in the development of customary
international law. See, e.g., I.M. Lobo de Souza, The Role of State Consent in the
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4.2. International Treaties
Along with customary international law, international treaties
are considered a principal source of international law.2°1 Trea-
ties can both codify existing customary international law and
create new sources of international law. 2 Similar to its role in
the development of customary international law, state practice
plays an important role in defining international treaties.
According to Lord McNair, it is well-settled that
when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision or
an expression contained in a treaty, the relevant conduct
of the contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty
(sometimes called 'practical construction') has a high
probative value as to the intention of the parties at the
time of its conclusion. This is both good sense and good
law.203
Customary Process, 44 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 521 (1995).
201 Article 2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
"treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, S 1(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 333. According to
Brownlie, "[l]aw-making treaties create general norms for the future conduct of
the parties in terms of legal propositions, and the obligations are basically the
same for all parties." BROWNLIE, supra note 156, at 12.
202 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, 5 102(3) ("International agreements
create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence
by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.").
The ICJ noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that customary
international law and treaty law can codify identical rules. North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Feb. 20).
Some authors suggest that both treaties and custom play an important role
in international law. See generally H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION (1972) (discussing the role of custom
in the codification of international law); R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66)
(discussing treaties as probative evidence of the existence of customary
international law); R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CouRs
25 (1970) (discussing treaties as evidence of the state of customary international
law); Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The
Distinction Between Treaty and Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
973 (1995) (distinguishing treaties from customary law).
203 LORD MCNAR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 424 (1961).
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A review of international legal practice attests to the importance
attached to state practice in the interpretation of treaties."°
For example, in the 1911 Chamizal arbitration case, the United
States and Mexico disputed the title of the Chamizal tract, a
territory bordering the two countries."5 In 1848 and 1853, the
United States and Mexico signed agreements designating the
middle of the Rio Grande as the legal boundary between the two
206countries. Subsequent changes in the course of the Rio
Grande, however, altered the territory of each country and placed
the ownership of the Chamizal tract in dispute.27 The Mexican
government argued that the treaties had established a fixed and
invariable boundary that could not be altered by the alluvial
process. 2 8 In contrast, the United States argued that the inter-
national boundary followed the course of the river; thus, the Rio
Grande should continue to function as the border.2M Unable to
resolve the matter through diplomatic channels, the parties
referred the case to the International Boundary Commission.2
204 Other legal scholars have reiterated this principle. For example,
Fitzmaurice indicated that:
[I]t is difficult to deny that the meaning of a treaty, or some part of it
.. may undergo a process of change or development in the course of
time. Where this occurs, it is the practice of the parties in relation to
the treaty that effects, and indeed is, that change or development....
for what is here in question is not so much the meaning ofan existing
text, as a revision of it, but a revision brought about by practice or
conduct, rather than effected by and recorded in writing.
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court offustice
1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
203, 225 (1957).
205 See The Chamizal Arbitration between the United States and Mexico, 5
AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 783, 786 (1911) [hereinafter Chamizal].
26 See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, Feb. 2, 1848,
US.-Mex., art. v, 9 Stat. 922; Gadsen Purchase Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, US.-Mex.,
T.S. 108.
207 See Chamizal, supra note 205, at 791.
209 See id.
209 See id.
210 The parties referred the case to the International Boundary Commission
on two occasions. On the first occasion, the two members of the Commission
were unable to agree on a decision. As a result, the United States and Mexico
agreed to enlarge the Commission to include a third Commissioner. It was
mutually decided that a Canadian jurist would be the third Commissioner. The
decision of the Commission could be rendered unanimously or by majority
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The Commission examined the language of the 1848 and 1853
agreements as well as the subsequent course of conduct of the
United States and Mexico to determine whether the parties
intended the Rio Grande to serve as a fixed line boundary.
211
It concluded that:
On the whole, it appears impossible to come to any other
conclusion that the two nations have, by their subsequent
treaties and their consistent course of action in connection
with all cases arising thereunder, put such an authoritative
interpretation upon the language of the Treaties of 1848
and 1853 as to preclude them from now contending that
the fluvial portion of the boundary created by those
treaties is a fixed boundary.
2 2
Thus, the Conimission held that the United States was entitled to
sovereignty over that portion of the disputed area that had been
altered by the alluvial process and that Mexico was entitled to
sovereignty over the remaining area.213
The influential 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law
of Treaties also recognized the role of state practice in the
interpretation of treaty provisions 4.2 " Article 19(a) of the
Convention provides that "[a] treaty is to be interpreted in the
light of the general purpose which it is intended to serve."215 It
then lists several elements which should be considered in connec-
vote and would be final and conclusive upon both governments. See id. at 785-
86.
21I See id. at 791-92.
212 See id. at 805.
213 See id. at 812. Following the Commission's ruling, the United States
announced it would not accept the award as binding because it had not been
granted sovereignty over the entire disputed area. Indeed, the dispute was not
resolved until a 1963 agreement between the United States and Mexico in
which the disputed area was divided between the two countries. See Treaty to
Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and
Colorado River as the International Boundary Between the United States and
Mexico, Nov. 23, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 23 U.S.T. 371; Convention for the Solution
fo the Chamizal Problem, Aug. 29, 1963, U.S.-Mex., 15 U.S.T. 21, 505 U.N.T.S
185.
214 See Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 973-
75 (Supp. 1935).
215 Id. at 937.
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tion with the purpose of the treaty."" These include "[t]he
historical background of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the
circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered
into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, [and]
the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions
of the treaty."21  The commentary attached to Article 19
provides:
In interpreting a treaty, the conduct or action of the
parties thereto cannot be ignored. If all the parties to a
treaty execute it, or permit its execution, in a particular
manner, that fact may reasonably be taken into account as
indicative of the real intention of the parties or of the
purpose which the instrument was designed to serve.21
Both the PCIJ and the ICJ have consistently held that
subsequent state practice maintains probative value as to the
meaning and understanding of treaty provisions. 2 9  The PCIJ
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 966.
219 The U.S. Supreme Court also looks to state practice to clarify treaty
provisions. See, e.g., Pigeon River Improvement v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291
U.S. 138, 158-60 (1934); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222-23 (1923). In
Factor v. Laubenheimer, the Court stated that "[i]n ascertaining the meaning of
a treaty, we may look beyond its written words to the negotiations and
diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties relating to the subject-
matter, and to their practical construction of it." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933).
The use of subsequent practice to clarify or interpret agreements is also
found in domestic contract law. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 435-36 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Margolin v. Franklin, 270
N.E.2d 140, 143 Ill. App. Ct. 1971). For example, Section 2-208 of the
Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for perfor-
mance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the perfor-
mance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of
performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control
course of performance and course of performance shall control both
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referred to state practice on several occasions?2' ° For example,
in the Competence of the International Labour Organization case,
the League of Nations requested an advisory opinion from the
PCIJ on the competence of the International Labour Organization
to regulate agricultural labor. 1  The PCIJ noted that the
International Labour Organization was established by Part XIII of
the Treaty of Versailles, which applied to agricultural labor.'
It recognized, however, that if there was any ambiguity in the
Treaty of Versailles, "the Court might, for the purpose of arriving
at the true meaning, consider the action which has been taken
under the Treaty."2  The PCIJ held that the parties repeated
dealings with the subject of agriculture during the intervening
period of the Treaty's signing and the raising of the debate
favored the inclusion of agriculture.2 4 Thus, the PCIJ conclud-
ed that the competence of the International Labor Organization
extends to international regulation of agricultural labor.2
The ICJ has also referred to state practice in interpreting treaty
provisions. In the Legal Consequences of South Africa in Namibia
case, the United Nations Security Council requested an advisory
opinion by the ICJ on the legal consequences for states regarding
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia in light of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 276.226 South Africa chal-
course of dealing and usage of trade (Section 1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver
or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of
performance.
U.C.C. § 2-208 (1972). The official comment to Section 2-208 provides that
"[t]he parties themselves know best what they have meant by their words of
agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of what
that meaning was." Id. cmt. 1.
220 See, e.g., Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B.) No.
15, at 18; Treaty of Lausanne, art. IH, para. 2, 1925 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 12, at
24-25.
221 See Advisory Opinion No. 2, International Labor Organization
Regulation of Agricultural Labor, 1922 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 2, at 10.
2n See id. at 23-25.
23 Id. at 39.
24 See id. at 3941.
11 See id. at 43.
26 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16, 17 Gune 21).
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lenged the validity of this request on the grounds that it had been
adopted despite the abstention of two permanent members of the
Security Council.' Specifically, South Africa argued that the
request violated Article 27 of the U.N. Charter which required
concurring votes by all the permanent members of the Security
Council." Without the concurring votes of the absent mem-
bers, South Africa argued the ICJ was not competent to deliver an
opinion. The ICJ reasoned, however, that the members of the
Security Council had always treated an abstention by a permanent
member as the equivalent of a concurring vote.29 The ICJ
U.N. Security Council Resolution 276 was adopted on January. 30, 1970.
It declared, inter alia, "that the continued presence of the South African
authorities in Namibia is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid." VII UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS, SERIES II, SECURITY COUNCIL, 49-50 (Dusan Djonovich ed.,
1990) [hereinafter RESOLUTIONS].
11 See 1971 I.C.J. at 22. France and the United Kingdom abstained from
voting. See RESOLUTIONS, supra note 226, at 50.
22 See Consequences, 1971 I.CJ. at 22. Article 27 of the U.N. Charter
provides:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
of the permanent members; provided that, in decision under a ter
VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute stall
abstain from voting.
U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
" The ICJ stated:
IT]he proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period
supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions
taken by members of the Council, in particular its permanent
members, have consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of
voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar
to the adoption of resolutions. By abstaining, a member does not
signify its objection to the approval of what is being proposed; in
order to prevent the adoption of a resolution requiring unanimity of
the permanent members, a permanent member has only to cast a
negative vote. This procedure followed by the Security Council,
which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 of
Article 27 of the Charter, has been generally accepted by Members of
the United Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organi-
zation.
1971 I.C.J. at 22.
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therefore concluded that the Security Council resolution request-
ing an advisory opinion had been adopted appropriately."
The use of state practice to interpret treaty provisions was
codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
entered into force in 1980." Article 31(1) of the Vienna Con-
vention requires the parties to interpret the treaty in good faith,
giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose.23'
Article 31(2) states that:
the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
2'0 See id. at 27; see also South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.)
1966 I.CJ. 4 ([uly 18); Certain Expenses of the United Nations 1962 I.C.J. 151
(uly 20); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania) 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Apr. 9). In the Corfu
Channel case, the ICJ alluded to the use of state practice in iding treaty inter-
pretation. See 1949 I.CJ. at 25. In the Certain Expenses of the United Nations
case, Judge Fitzmaurice stated that "practice must be a very relevant factor....
The interpretation in fact given to an international instrument by the parties
to it, as a matter of settled- practice, is good presumptive (and may in certain
cases be virtually conclusive) evidence of what the correct legal interpretation
is." Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 201. In the South
West Africa cases, the ICJ noted the importance of state practice in interpreting
treaties. See South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 135-36 (stating "[t]he interpreta-
tions placed on instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as
to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain
recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument").
231 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see
,enerally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1970) (describing the
history and provisons of the Vienna Convention); Richard D. Kearney &
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970)
(interpreting the provisions of the Vienna Convention).
232 See Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 31, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
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related to the treaty"
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that, together
with the context of the treaty, there shall be taken into account:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regar-
ing the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.24
Finally, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that
"recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstanc-
es of its conclusion ... when the interpretation according to
article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b)
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."13'
According to the International Law Commission ("ILC"),
which prepared the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the
importance of subsequent practice in the interpretation of a treaty
is obvious since it illustrates the parties' understanding of the
meaning of the treaty.236 In its commentary of Article 31(3)(b)
of the Vienna Convention, the ILC stated:
The value of subsequent practice varies according as it
shows the common understanding of the parties as to the
meaning of the terms. The Commission considered that
subsequent practice establishing the understanding of the
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty should be
included in paragraph 3 as an authentic means of interpre-
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. art. 32, 8 I.L.M. at 692.
236 See Official Records, United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties, Documents of the Conference (1971), at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.-
39/11/Add.2 [hereinafter Documents].
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tation alongside.interpretative agreements.237
Under the provisions of the Vienna Convention, therefore, state
practice is considered relevant for the interpretation of treaty
provisions.
238
The preceding analysis indicates that state practice can be used
to interpret international agreements. It also raises an interesting
question: can state practice actually modify an international
agreement?
In the 1963 Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, the
United States and France disagreed as to the interpretation of the
1946 Air Transport Services Agreement.2"9 The principal issue
237 Id. at 42.
23 The concept of state practice is referred to in several other provisions
of the Vienna Convention. For example, Article 45 provides that:
A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating,
withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under
articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware of the
facts:
It shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in
orce or continues in operation, as the case may be; or
b) It must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced
in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in
operation, as the case may be.
Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 45, 8 I.L.M. at 697. According to the
International Law Commission, "[t]he foundation of the principle that apart
is not permitted to benefit from its own inconsistencies is essentially goodfaith
and fair dealing (allegans contraria non audiendus est)." Documents, supra note
236, at 59. With reference to paragraph (b), the International Law Commission
indicated that a "State is not permitted to take up a legal position which is in
contradiction with the position which its own previous conduct must have led
the other parties to suppose that it had taken up with respect to the validity,
maintenance in force or maintenance in operation of the treaty." Id. At the
Conference, several states introduced proposals to delete paragraph (b).
However, these proposals were defeated. See United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 390-402 (1969) [hereinafter
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session].
Similarly, Article 8 of the Vienna Convention provides that "[a]n act
relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who cannot be
considered under article 7 as authorized to represent a State for that purpose
is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by that State." Vienna
Convention, supra note 231, art. 8, 8 I.L.M. at 683; see also Documents, supra
note 236, at 13-14 (stating commentary by the International Law Commission
on Draft Article 8).
2' See Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (United States v.
France) 38 I.L.R. 182, 186 (1963). The United States and France have been
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was whether a U.S. air carrier, Pan American Airways, could
route international aviation services through Paris in flights
between the United States and Turkey and Iran. 4' France
argued that the Agreement did not provide for such rights.24 1
In interpreting the Agreement, the arbitral tribunal noted the
importance of the conduct of the parties subsequent to the
conclusion of the Agreement.242 Indeed, the practice and subse-
quent conduct of the parties could be used as a supplementary
means of interpretation:
This method may be susceptible of either confirming or
contradicting, and even possibly of correcting, the conclu-
sions furnished by the interpretations based on an examina-
tion of the text and the preparatory work, for the purposes
of determining the common intention of the Parties when
they concluded the Agreement.243
In addition, the tribunal determined that the conduct of the
parties from the time when the first differences of opinion arose
was particularly relevant, since it may be useful for interpreting
the Agreement, and provide a source of subsequent modifica-
tion.2 Specifically, the Tribunal decided that conduct would
play a decisive role in cases where:
express or implied consent has been given to a certain
claim or the exercise of a certain activity, or cases where
an attitude - whether it can rightly or not be described as
a form of tacit consent - certainly has the same effects on
involved in several other disputes concerning air transportation. See Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration - Or Both? The 1978 United States-France
Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1980) (describing the arbitration of
a different dispute between Pan Am airways and France).
240 See 38 I.L.R. at 187.
241 See id. at 219.
242 See id. at 245.
243 Id. at 245-46.
244 See id. at 249 ("This course of conduct may, in fact, be taken into
account not merely as a means useful for interpreting the Agreement, but also
as . . a possible source of subsequent modification, arising out of certain
actions or certain attitudes, having a bearing on the juridical situaiton of the
parties and on the rights that each of them could properly claim.").
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the resulting juridical situation between the Parties as
consent properly speaking would have. The Tribunal is
referring in particular to assumptions such as the follow-
ing: the interested party has not, in fact, raised an objec-
tion that it may have had the possibility of raising, or it
has abandoned, or not renewed at a time when the
opportunity occurred, the objection that it raised at the
outset; or while objecting in principle, it has in fact
consented to the continuance of the action in respect of
which it has expressed the objection; or again, it has given
implied consent, resulting from the consent expressed in
connection with a situation related to the subject-matter of
the dispute."
Applying these principles of interpretation, the arbitral
tribunal concluded that the 1963 Air Transport Agreement did
not authorize U.S. air carriers to route international aviation
services through Paris in flights between the United States and
Turkey and Iran.246  The language of the Agreement did not
indicate an intention to authorize such services.24 However, the
tribunal determined that subsequent agreements, as well as the
conduct of the parties, had modified the original Agreement.
These modifications granted U.S. air carriers the right to provide
aviation services through the disputed routes.24
In the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the ILC submit-
ted an article which recognized the modification of treaties
through subsequent practice. The draft article provided that, "[a]
treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify
245 Id. at 249-50.
246 See id. at 256-58.
247 See id.
248 See id. The Tribunal, however, ruled against the United States on one
issue and concluded that "a United States airline has not the right to carry
traffic which is embarked in Paris and disembarked at Istanbul, Ankara or
other points in Turkey, or embarked at Istanbul, Ankara or other points in
Turkey and disembarked at Paris." Id. at 257; see also Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J. 17, 34 (May 26) (using subsequent conduct as
a tool in interpreting the validity of a jurisdictional agreement signed by
Thailand).
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its provisions."2 49 In its commentary, the ILC indicated that
"[tihis article covers cases where the parties by common consent
in fact apply the treaty in a manner which its provisions do not
envisage." 2° The ILC noted that subsequent practice in the
application of a treaty,
is authoritative evidence as to its interpretation when the
practice is consistent, and establishe[s] ... understanding
regarding the meaning of the provisions of the treaty.
Equally, a consistent practice, establishing the common
consent of the parties to the application of the treaty in a
manner different from that laid down in certain of its
provisions, may have the effect of modifying the trea-
ty.2
51
The ILC cited the Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration
with approval. 52
During the Conference on the Law of Treaties, however, the
draft article was deleted.253 Several countries expressed the
concern that uncertainty might result from such a provision.2
Countries also expressed concerns about the domestic ramifica-
tions of the provision. 5  Some delegates considered the pro-
249 Documents, supra note 236, at 55.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See id. at 55-56.
" See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session,
supra note 238, at 401.
254 For example, the Vietnamese representative said that "[to allow for the
possibility of modifying the treaty by subsequent practice would open the door
to all kinds of interpretations, in the course of which the treaty might lose
much of its substance." Id. at 208. Similarly, the French representative argued
that "if States were given the impression that any flexible attitude towards the
application of a treaty was tantamount to agreement to modify the treaty, they
would tend in [the] future to become much more circumspect and rigid in their
attitudes." Id. at 208.
25 For example, the French representative indicated that the
adoption of the article might raise serious constitutional problems for
many States: the principle of formal parallelism required that
modifications of a treaty at the domestic level should follow the same
procedure as the original text. If the manner in which the responsible
officials applied the treaty was in itself capable of leading to modifica-
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posed article unnecessary2 In constrast, other countries argued
that the draft article simply reflected the inherent flexibility of
international law and was consistent with customary practice. z
In response to the comments made by the state representatives,
Sir Humphrey Waldock, the Special Rapporteur on the law of
treaties for the International Law Commission, indicated that the
draft article,
tion, that requirement of parallelism could hardly be met.
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, supra note
238, at 208.
A related issue arose following the Reagan administration's attempt to
reinterpret the ABM Treaty in the mid-1980s. See RAYMOND GARTHOFF,
POLICY VERSUS THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY
(1987) (rejecting the notion that new technology calls for reinterpretaton and
modification of the 1972 ABM treaty between the Soviet Union and the United
States); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development
of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caeer, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986) (calling for interpretation that is consistent with the
original principles espoused in the 1972 ABM treaty); Abraham D. Sofaer, The
ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986)
(attempting to define the intended original meaning of "exotic" systems and
components in the 1972 ABM treaty).
256 For example, the Israeli representative Shabtai Rosenne noted that while
"he would not go so far as to say that the rule in question did not exist in
international law," he thought it was already covered by other articles of the
treaty. See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session,
supra note 238, at 213.
217 See id. at 211-14. According to the Iraqi representative:
Sovereign States could act as they wished, within certain limits of
course: it was sufficient for their agreement to be clear. The agree-
ment of the parties sufficed to terminate or modify a treaty. That
agreement need not be in the form of a solemn instrument. [The draft
article] did not depart from those principles. It provided that
agreement to modify a treaty was established by practice, that was to
say by a series of acts: not just any practice, but one which could be
attributed to States. That excluded an act by a consul or other official
who exceeded his powers.
Id. at 211. Similarly, the Italian representative stated:
International law was not a slave to formalism and by reason of its
nature must adapt itself to practical realities. It was true that the
written form was the normal form for an agreement and the one
which afforded the most complete legal certainty, but there were other
means of expressing an agreement, among which practice was the most
reliable and the most obvious. A glance at history could only make
one thankful that, in certain cases, practice had modified treaties,
which might otherwise have had tragic consequences.
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was based on the principle that a State which had taken up
a position on a point of law, particularly in the interpreta-
tion of treaties, and allowed another State to act in
accordance with that understanding of the legal position,
could not go back on its representation of the legal
position and declare the act performed illegal. "8
According to Waldock, the draft article would serve to codify
existing practice.259 Waldock indicated that although Article 3
of the Vienna Convention, which refers to international agree-
ments not in written terms, 6° could be used to support the use
of state practice to modify treaties, the ILC thought it wiser to
deal with the question in a separate article.16' Finally, Waldock
argued that the use of state practice to modify treaties had never
before raised any constitutional problems. Indeed, "[i]f the
application of a treaty provision conflicted with national law, the
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country
concerned would object and request that the treaty be amend-
ed.,
262
Despite the deletion of this draft article, the Vienna Conven-
tion recognizes the right of parties to amend or modify interna-
tional agreements. Articles 39 through 41 address the amendment
211 Id. at 214.
21 See id. at 215.
260 Article 3 of the Vienna Convention provides:
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of internation-
al law or between such other subjects of international law, or to
international agreements not in written form, shall not affect:
The legal force of such agreements;
The application to them of any of the rules set forth in the
present Convention to which they would be subject under
international law independently of the Convention;
(c) The application of the Convention to the relations of States as
between themselves under international agreements to which other
subjects of international law are also parties.
Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 3, 8 I.L.M. at 694.
261 See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session,
supra note 238, at 214.
262 Id. at 214-15.
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and modification of treaties."3 Nothing in these sections pre-
cludes parties from using state practice to modify or amend an
international agreement. Indeed, the ILC recognized that "in
some cases treaties, especially those in simplified form, were varied
by informal procedures and even by oral agreement of minis-
ters." 264  According to Waldock, such informal procedures
between states remained valid.265
In summary, state practice is relevant in both the interpreta-
tion and modification of international agreements.
5. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MERGER: THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section suggests that the concept of state practice
facilitates the development of endogenous governance structures
that address the problems raised by transaction costs.
5.1. State Practice and Treaty Law
State practice reduces the transaction costs associated with the
development and operation of treaties in three ways. First, state
practice relieves parties of the burden of trying to address every
possible contingency that may arise in the course of the relation-
ship in the initial agreement. Rather, the agreement can act as a
guide, establishing the broad parameters of the relationship and
setting forth basic rules. The parties' subsequent conduct fills in
the gaps. This provides states with the flexibility necessary to
address new or changing circumstances while their actions remain
grounded within the context of the original agreement.
Second, state practice can be used to interpret the original
agreement if subsequent ambiguities arise. This feature is both
legitimate and practical. State practice requires the mutual assent
of each party in order to be binding. In addition, the parties
263 Article 39 provides that "[a] treaty may be amended by agreement
between the parties." Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 39, 8 J.L.M. at
694. Article 40 governs the amendment of multilateral treaties by all the
parties to the treaty. See id. art. 40, 8 I.L.M. at 694-95. Article 41 governs the
modification of multilateral treaties between certain parties. See id. art. 41, 8
I.L.M. at 695.
264 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, supra
note 238, at 204.
265 See id. In support of this statement, Waldock cited Article 3 of the
Vienna Convention. See id.
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themselves are the most capable of understanding the nature and
scope of their relationship. 66 Indeed, state practice "represents
the common-sense practical interpretation of the treaty under the
varied contingencies of its ongoing operation."267
Third, state practice can be used to modify the original
agreement. This allows parties to address new circumstances
without resorting to more formal and time-consuming mecha-
nisms. As noted in the deliberations of the Vienna Convention,
such practice is perhaps the most reliable and efficient method for
affirming legal certainty between states. 26' Resorting to state
practice is less costly than resorting to more formal arrangements.
State practice also reduces the likelihood that a state can unilateral-
ly take advantage of new circumstances because state practice
requires the mutual assent of all states involved.
Despite the broad benefits of state practice, some scholars have
questioned whether international law is capable of addressing the
dynamic nature of international affairs. In his article, Understand-
ing Dynamic Obligations, Edwin Smith criticizes traditional
doctrinal approaches to international agreements. According to
Smith, prior to the twentieth century, few international agree-
ments established dynamic relationships between states.269
Rather, most international agreements "served principally as static
frameworks resulting from efforts to avoid intolerable internation-
al conflicts."270 As a result, international legal doctrine also
began to view such agreements as static. Traditional doctrines
protect the fixed expectations of the parties and do not adequately
respond to changing circumstances such as new technology or
266 According to Gerald McGinley, state practice
represents the ongoing pragmatic understanding of those individuals
who have functioned under and within the treaty's terms. If this is so,
one might ask, wherein lies the evidentiary value of such practice?
The answer seems to be that those actually engaged in working under
the treaty are likely to have more knowledge an experience about the
realities of the functioning of the treaty than either those who
prepared it or those who have dealt with it from a distance or for a
limited period of time.
Gerald P. McGinley, Practice as a Guide to Treaty Interpretation, 9 THE
FLETCHER FORUM 211, 227 (1985).
267 Id.
268 See supra note 257.
269 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1575.
270 Id. at 1576.
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acquired information." According to Smith, "[tihe changing
nature of international agreements limits the utility of traditional
treaty doctrines." 2
Smith criticizes the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
as being exceedingly static and incapable of accommodating
dynamic obligations? 3  He argues that provisions concerning
the interpretation of treaties emphasize the text of the agreement
as the principal indicator of the intent of the parties.2 4 Other
evidence of state intent is relegated to a secondary role.' By
focusing on the text, the Vienna Convention provides a technique
for measuring state intent that is "archaic and unduly rigid."27 6
The characteristics of "these traditional rules provide little guid-
ance for parties seeking to comply with agreements that create
dynamic obligations."' However, Smith does acknowledge the
strengths of the Vienna Convention:
In essence, the Vienna Convention provides traffic-control
rules for formal treaty relationships, allowing parties to
determine their own goals while setting parameters for the
manner in which each party uses the treaty relationships
to achieve those goals. However, traditional procedural
rules applicable to the obligations of formal international
agreements cannot address the substantive problems
involved in preserving agreements that generate dynamic
obligations. 8
Smith's analysis of international law and the Vienna Conven-
tion both underemphasizes the benefits of state practice and
overemphasizes the limitations of textual interpretation. By
recognizing the primacy of the text, the Vienna Convention
provides a foundation for the parties' relationship. Although the
27' See id. at 1577.
272 Id. at 1575.
27' See id. at 1578-83.
274 See id. at 1578.
25 See id.
276 Id. at 1579 (quoting Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, supra
note 231, at 570).
277 Id. at 1580.
271 Id. at 1582.
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relationship may evolve and expand beyond its original parame-
ters, the original text provides a common reference point and a
stable foundation for subsequent practice. By recognizing the
importance of state practice, however, the Vienna Convention
provides a mechanism through which the parties can adapt their
agreement as the relationship develops.
Indeed, the importance of stability and flexibility in contractu-
al arrangements is well-documented. In modern economic
structures, there is a constant clash "between the need for stability
and the need to respond to change. " 279  Interestingly, this
analysis is consistent with Smith's depiction of dynamic agree-
ments as "agreements that allow the parties to mutually adjust
commitments while maintaining a shared perception of reciprocal
responsibility."28 ' According to Smith:
Formal binding agreements can be most helpful if they
contain provisions that allow the evolution of obligations
and give greater assurances to the parties of the continued
viability of the relationship. With sufficient flexibility,
formal agreements assist in the establishment of evolving
relationships between states, which can facilitate a variety
of mutually beneficial adaptive responses to technological,
political and economic changes.281
Other scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau, are even more
critical of treaty law. According to Morgenthau, a primary
criticism of international law is that it lacks precision and,
therefore, binding force:
In order to find a common basis on which all those
different national interests can meet in harmony, rules of
international law embodied in general treaties must often
be vague and ambiguous, allowing all the signatories to
read the recognition of their own national interests into
the legal text agreed upon.282
" Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 59, at 854.
280 Smith, supra note 6, at 1557.
281 Id.
282 MORGENTHAU, supra note 146, at 299-300.
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Morgenthau's criticism, however, suffers several defects. First,
most international agreements are, in fact, quite explicit. Second,
Morgenthau fails to recognize the primary reason for entering
international agreements - to establish stable expectations and to
reduce uncertainty. If treaty interpretation was entirely subjec-
tive, treaties could not perform this task of promoting stability
and reducing uncertainty since states could read their own
national interests into any legal text. Thus, states are limited from
engaging in such extreme forms of self-serving behavior because of
their interest in promoting stability and reducing uncertainty.
Third, there may be certain advantages to leaving some treaty
provisions ambiguous. As Morgenthau recognizes, treaties are
often drafted in ambiguous language in order "to obtain the
approval of all subjects of the law."283 Such ambiguities, howev-
er, can be resolved by subsequent state practice. States gain the
short-term advantages of wide spread treaty acceptance and the
long-term advantages of binding agreements. 84
5.2. State Practice and Customary International Law
Unlike treaty law, customary international law is not based
upon formal written agreements. Rather, customary international
law develops as the result of uniform and consistent state practice
followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
Customary international law allows states to establish binding
relationships without resorting to the formalism of the treaty
process. Instead of formal and time-consuming negotiations,
customary international law recognizes the role of state practice
in establishing the relationship between the states. By recognizing
that their consistent practice may give rise to a binding rule of
international law, states are encouraged to establish long-term
relationships. This customary practice, in turn, promotes regular
patterns of behavior. Customary practice also clarifies state
expectations about their respective entitlements, further stabilizing
283 Id. at 299.
284 It should be recognized, however, that ambiguities in international
agreements may give rise to problems. See William J. Aceves, Ambiguities in
Plurilingual Treaties: A Case Study of Article 22 of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, 27 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 187 (1996) [hereinafter Aceves,
Ambiguities].
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the relationship between states." 5 As the relationship between
the states advances, it naturally responds to unforeseen contingen-
cies. As state practice develops into customary international law,
it becomes binding upon those states that have acquiesced in its
formation and development. 6 Yet, customary international law
also recognizes that state practice can change. Indeed, state
practice can give rise to a new rule of customary international
law.287 It can also modify treaty obligations.2 8 Thus, custom-
ary international law allows states to reap the benefits of a formal
relationship without the limitations imposed by a formal agree-
ment.
The importance of custom has been well-documented in
several contexts.289 Custom has been referred to as "a set of
285 For an analysis of the importance of property rights and clear
entitlements, see KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 11, at 88-89;
Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 5, at 396-98; Anthony
D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1306-08
(1984).
286 See supra Section 4.1.
27 Efforts to develop such causal explanations for the development of
customary international law have only recently been suggested. See, e.g., Daniel
M. Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 667 (1995) (reviewing KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATION-
AL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1993)); Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of
Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 132-34 (1995) (discussing Keohane's definition of
conventions and customary international law).
28. See supra Section 4.2.
289 See, e.g., MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1985) (discussing how the
model of a dual legal system of British law and African customary law is
inadequate); JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL
ORDER (1989) (discussing the conditions for order in the social world); THE
POLImcAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE (Terry L. Anderson &
Randy T. Simmons eds., 1993) (examining the importance of custom and
culture in regulating behavior); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE
OF NORMS (1977) (examining the rise and functions of social norms and
customs); Kaushik Basu et al., 7he Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the
New Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON.
HIST. 1 (1987) (examining the problem of endogenizing customs, evaluating the
claims for the optimality of institutions, and commenting on the interplay
between structural and inertial forces); Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom, 149 J.
INST. & THEOR. ECON. 178 (1993) (reflecting on the motivational forces of
custom as brought about by history); Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of
the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth
Century, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 183 (1993) (analyzing custom and the common
law).
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behavioral dispositions inherited from the past."29 Custom
establishes expectations regarding certain behavior. In turn, these
expectations can guide economic transactions without the need for
costly safeguards. 291 Through this process, custom may contrib-
ute to economic efficiency.
The importance of custom has also been identified in the
literature on path dependence.292 Path dependence identifies the
influence of inertia, a process which forms and guides institutional
development: "Once a development path is set on a particular
course, the network externalities, the learning process of organiza-
tions, and the historically derived subjective modeling of the issues
reinforce the course."293 As Douglas North points out, path
dependence means that history matters. The role of path
dependence is particularly significant in the legal setting, where
legal precedent influences subsequent legal decisions and state
294actions. For example, the development of the common law
290 Schlicht, supra note 289, at 178.
291 See id. at 180 ("The importance of custom stems from the fact that it
creates entitlements and preferences which shape economic transactions ....
In this way, custom may render many economic transactions possible without
a need to rely on elaborate and costly safeguards.").
292 For a discussion of path dependence, see W. BRIAN ARTHUR,
INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994);
THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM (Philip W. Anderson et
al. eds., 1988); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 98-100 (1990); Paul A. David, Clio and the
Economics of QWERTY, 75-2 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 205 (1995).
293 NORTH, supra note 292, at 99.
294 The genealogical method of analysis shares similar elements. This
approach was acknowledged by Nietzsche who noted that:
The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual
employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart;
whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again
reinterpreted to new ends.... and the entire history of a "thing," an
organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever
new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to
be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed
and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 77 (Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1989); see also Michel Foucault, Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History, in THE FOUCAULT READER 76 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984)
(discussixng the relationship between geneology and the three modalities of
history Nietzsche recognized). For an application of the genealogical method
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represents a form of institutional change. The common law is
based on precedent, providing both continuity and predictability
that are critical to reducing uncertainty among contracting parties.
As North states, "[p]ast decisions become embedded in the
structure of law, which changes marginally as new cases arise
involving new, or at least in terms of past cases unforeseen, issues;
when decided these become, in turn, a part of the legal frame-
work."
295
Robert Keohane alluded to the role of custom in his analysis
of conventions, or informal institutions.296 In contrast to formal
organizations or regimes, Keohane defined conventions as
"informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that
shape the expectations of actors. They enable actors to under-
in international relations see James F. Keeley, Toward a Foucauldian Analysis
of International Regimes, 44 INT'L ORG. 83 (1990); Richard Price, A Genealogy
of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT'L ORG. 73 (1995).
29s NORTH, supra note 292, at 96-97; see also 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 115-18 (1973) (discussing how judicial decisions are
predictable as a result of reliance on precedent); Victor P. Goldberg, Institution-
al Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 482 (1974)
(arguing that institutional choice takes place under great ignorance of existing
institutions); Ronald A. Heiner, Impeifect Decisions and the Law: On the
Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986) (arguing
that costly and imperfect information are responsible for major procedures that
have evolved in the law).
296 See Robert Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World
Politics, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 4 (1989).
According to Keohane, there are three forms of institutions: (1) formal inter-
governmental or cross-national non-governmental organizations; (2) inter-
national regimes; and (3) conventions. Id. at 3-4.
Indeed, Michael Byers recognized the similarity between Keohane's
definition of conventions and customary international law.
Keohane's definition of conventions is similar to, and would seem to
encompass, the process of customary international law. Like many
customary rules, Keohane's conventions are 'temporally and logically
prior to regimes or formal international organizations' and '[i]n the
absence of conventions, it would be difficult for states to negotiate
with one another or even to understand the meaning of each other's
actions.' Unlike customary rules, however, Keohane's conventions do
not appear to be legally binding. Conventions, like regimes and
organizations, are voluntary constructs of states. However, unlike the
explicit rules involved in regimes and organizations, conventions are
not 'contractual' in nature. Therefore, non-conformity with conven-
tions merely imposes efficiency costs and does not constitute a breach
of legal obligations.
Byers, supra note 287, at 133 (quoting Keohane (citation omitted)).
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stand one another and, without explicit rules, to coordinate their
behavior."297 Keohane argued that "[c]onventions are not only
pervasive in world politics but also temporally and logically prior
to regimes or formal international organizations. In the absence
of conventions, it would be difficult for states to negotiate with
one another or even to understand the meaning of each other's
actions."298 The importance of custom, therefore, resides in its
ability to shape the expectations of actors and constrain behavior
in the absence of explicit rules. 99
5.3. Summary
International institutions play an important role in establishing
cooperation among states, even in a decentralized world.
However, the development and operation of institutions may be
affected by transaction costs. Therefore, institutions must develop
exogenous or endogenous governance structures to alleviate the
problems raised by transaction costs.
This Article suggests that state practice facilitates the develop-
ment of endogenous governance structures, thereby reducing the
problems raised by transaction costs and increasing the likelihood
of cooperation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that state practice is relevant for interpreting and
modifying treaty provisions. State practice reduces the problems
raised by transaction costs by allowing states to interpret and even
modify their original agreement through subsequent practice.
297 Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,
supra note 296, at 4.
211 Id. However, Keohane suggests that conventions cannot address severe
Prisoner's Dilemma situations. Keohane states that "[c]onventions are
especially appropriate for situations of coordination, where it is to everyone's
interest to behave in a particular way as long as others also do so. More
specific contractual solutions ... are necessary to deal with prisoners' dilemma
problems of major significance." Id.
299 See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONs AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992).
According to Knight,
[s]ocial institutions are sets of rules that structure social interactions in
particular ways. These rules (1) provide information about how
eople are expected to act in particular situations, (2) can be recognized
y those who are members of the relevant group as the rules to which
others conform in these situations, and (3) structure the strategic
choices of actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes.
Id. at 54.
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This reduces the need to draft extensive agreements at the outset.
It also provides states with the flexibility to address new circum-
stances while remaining grounded within the context of their
original agreement. Furthermore, state practice that is continuous
and long-standing may develop into customary international law
and be considered legally binding on those states that acquiesce in
its formation and development. Customary international law
allows states to promote cooperation in the absence of formal
agreements. It minimizes the problems raised by transaction costs
by allowing states to forego explicit negotiations and to function
even in the absence of a formal structure. It is also flexible
enough to address new circumstances as they arise. In both treaty
law and customary international law, therefore, state practice
facilitates the development of endogenous governance structures
that address the problems raised by transaction costs.
This Article also suggests that transaction costs will have a
significant impact on whether states choose treaty law or custom-
ary international law in the development of international
institutions." As indicated by Williamson, "[t]ransaction cost
economics maintains that there are rational economic reasons for
organizing some transactions one way and other transactions
another."3"1 Treaty law promotes cooperation by establishing
formal agreements. These agreements serve several purposes.
They highlight the importance of the relationship by publicizing
" This conclusion is consistent with the notion that costs may affect legal
form. As costs increase, some forms of law may be more efficient than others.
See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (fashioning a standard for administrative rule-making in
order to deal with dissatisfacton over the precision of administrative rules);
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Le$al Rulemaking, 3I. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (examining the degree of precision with which a
egal command is expressed as a determinant of the efficiency of the legal
process); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DUKE
J. 557 (1992) (offering an economic analysis of the extent to which legal
comments should be promulgated as rules or standards); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976)
(discussing differences between rigid highly administrable rules and equitable
standards in solving legal problems); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (stating that rigid rules depend on
shared social understanding and facilitate social interactions).
301 WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra
note 34, at 52.
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the respective rights and obligations of member states. °2 They
raise the costs of noncompliance. They promote efficiency by
identifying and allocating property rights. Above all, they
minimize uncertainty and promote stable expectations by setting
forth rights and obligations in precise language.
Customary international law also promotes cooperation, but
it does so in the absence of formal agreements. Whereas treaties
require an extensive process leading to formal codification,
customary international law does not. Rather, customary
international law develops among states that acquiesce in its
formation and development. If the transaction costs associated
with the negotiation of treaty law are high, states may prefer
customary international law because it allows states to forego
expensive and time-consuming negotiations. Likewise, if the
transaction costs associated with the codification of treaty law are
high, states may also prefer customary international law because
it does not require a formal agreement. Finally, if the transaction
costs associated with the maintenance of treaty law are high, states
may prefer customary international law because it functions even
in the absence of a formal structure. In short, each form of
international law serves a unique purpose. As transaction cost
economics suggests, efficiency will guide the development of
international institutions.3 3
A final caveat should be noted. This Article has emphasized
how state practice can reduce the problems raised by transaction
costs in the development and maintenance of international
institutions. There are, however, some limitations to the use of
state practice. Perhaps the most significant limitation is uncertain-
302 See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?,
45 INT'L ORG. 495, 508 (1991); see also Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice
o Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 787, 789 (1986)
(stating that there is no requirement to publish an informal agreement); R.R.
Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549
(1980) (discussing different requirements of treaties and agreements).
303 This conclusion is consistent with the notion that law and legal systems
must ultimately serve the interests of the actors that function in their ambit.
For an analysis of how legal systems are reactive to the interests of such actors,
see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Symposium, Foreword: Positive
Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992); John A. Ferejohn &
Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 263(1992); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Positive and Normative
Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative
Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307 (special issue, 1990).
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ty. As noted by Friedrich Kratochwil, "[t]he main advantage of
'nailing things down' with explicitly stated norms is that norms
allow one to separate the disagreements on a particular issue from
the rest of the ongoing social interactions."3 " Indeed, this can
raise significant problems when states seek to use state practice to
clarify ambiguities.3"5 Another concern is the possibility that
state practice will be resorted to out of short-term expediency
rather than long-term interests:
Because of this, great care must be taken to ensure that a
particular practice is not crystallized into rule of law to the
detriment of the larger principles and purposes of the
instrument. Such a use of the practice would stultify a
treaty as readily as would a rigid adherence to text without
regard to the practical realities of the treaty's opera-
tions.306
Finally, state practice, like all law, is subject to interpretation and,
therefore, is susceptible to the vagaries of interpretation. 7
6. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates the benefits of an interdisciplinary
approach to the study of international cooperation. By merging
the disciplines of law, international relations, and economics, this
study provides new insights into the function of international law
and, specifically, the concept of state practice.
More broadly, this Article has sought to move beyond the
reflectivist approach that has guided most studies of international
legal scholarship.3 °0 By examining the function of international
law, this study seeks to instill a rationalistic foundation to
international legal scholarship.3 9 By recognizing the rationalis-
304 Kratochwil, supra note 82, at 91.
31 See Aceves, Ambiguities, supra note 284.
31 McGinley, supra note 266, at 230.
307 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 26, at 10-13.
For a description of reflectivist and rationalistic approaches, see
Keohane, International Institutions. Two Approaches, supra note 17, at 382.
109 See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 13 (1978) (exploring "the relation between the behavior
characteristics of the individuals who comprise some social aggregate, and the
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tic elements which underlie international law, this study seeks to
provide a significant contribution to the scientific study of
international cooperation. Finally, by revealing the influence of
law on state behavior, this Article hopes to reaffirm the relevance
of international law.
characteristics of the aggregate").
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